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Abstract 
Hacking information systems is continuously on the increase. Social engineering 
attacks is performed by manipulating the weakest link in the security chain; people. 
Consequently, this type of attack has gained a higher rate of success than a technical 
attack. 
Based in Expert Systems, this study proposes a proactive and integrated 
Intelligent Social Engineering Security Model to mitigate the human risk and reduce the 
impact of social engineering attacks. 
Many computer users do not have enough security knowledge to be able to 
select a strong password for their authentication. The author has attempted to implement 
a novel quantitative approach to achieve strong passwords. A new fuzzy logic tool is 
being developed to evaluate password strength and measures the password strength 
based on dictionary attack, time crack and shoulder surfing attack (social engineering). 
A comparative study of existing tools used by major companies such as Microsoft, 
Google, CertainKey, Yahoo and Facebook are used to validate the proposed model and 
tool. 
A comprehensive literature survey and analytical study performed on phishing 
emails representing social engineering attacks that are directly related to financial fraud 
are presented and compared with other security threats. This research proposes a novel 
approach that successfully addresses social engineering attacks. Another intelligent tool 
is developed to discover phishing messages and provide educational feedback to the 
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user focusing on the visible part of the incoming emails, considering the email’s source 
code and providing an in-line awareness security feedback. 
KEYWORDS: Information Security, Authentication, Email Phishing, Security 
Awareness, Fuzzy Logic. 
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1 Introduction 
Background 
1.1 What is information? 
Information is an asset like any other important business asset (ISO 
2005) which can exist in many forms; it can be a written document, an electronic 
document (such as a video or voice recording) or data stored on backup media. It 
is therefore important to be protected, as it is extremely valuable to 
organisations. 
1.2 What is Information Security? 
Managing information security was defined by the ISO 17799 standards 
as “the protection of all kinds of information including systems from a wide 
range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimise business risk, 
and maximise return on investments and business opportunities” (ISO 2005). 
This applies to both private and public sector where the reputation and revenue 
of the business are concerned. 
By implementing an information security plan, three elements can be 
preserved for any business: 
1. Confidentiality, to ensure that important information can be accessed by 
authorised people. 
2. Integrity, to ensure that transmitted information is not altered or updated by 
unauthorised people. 
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3. Availability, to ensure that authorised people can access the information 
whenever they need it. 
 
Figure1: The three important elements of Information Security (Olzak 2011)  
Information security can be performed in different ways. It can be 
policies and procedures that guide managers and employees to protect their 
assets against threats and breaches. It can be software such as antivirus and IDS 
(Intrusion Detection Systems) or it can be hardware such as firewalls or access 
cards, it can also be a training awareness programs for administrators, technical 
and end-users. In other words, we can use the above-mentioned ways as security 
controls to protect information. 
1.3 Why do we need information security? 
Threats, breaches and identity thefts are occurs every day (Whitman and 
Mattord 2012); failure to prevent business hindrances could cause huge losses. 
Information 
Security 
Integrity 
Confidentiality 
Availability 
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Companies are striving daily to counter all kinds of IT attacks, thus illustrating 
the seriousness of the matter. 
A CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (conducted by the 
Computer Security Institute) showed that average annual losses increased from 
US $320m to $1.1b for the period between 1997 and 2002 (Panko 2003). In 
most cases, computer threats are increased by more than 300%, as shown in 
figure 2. Meanwhile, new figures reported by federal agencies to US-CERT (the 
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team) between 2006 and 2010 
showed that the number of incidents had increased from 5,503 to 41,776 
(Wilshusen 2011). 
 
Figure 2: CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey Results (Panko 2003) 
The number of vulnerabilities is on the rise as well. The following table 
shows the number of vulnerabilities and security incidents in the years 1999, 
2000 and 2001 (Berg. 2006) 
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Year Number of Vulnerabilities 
Reported 
Number of Security 
Incidents 
1999 417 10,000 
2000 1,090 21,756 
2001 2,437 52,658 
Table 1: Number of Vulnerabilities and Security Incidents Reported (Berg. 2006) 
During the period 2006-2011, Symantec Corporation’s analytical study 
showed the number of vulnerabilities at ~4800 new vulnerabilities in 2011, a 
decrease of about 20% in new vulnerabilities as reported in 2010. The study 
concluded that the actual number of new vulnerabilities discovered decreased 
while the trend is still upwards (Symantec April 2012). Figure 3 shows the new 
vulnerabilities identified between 2006 and 2011, based on Symantec’s internet 
security threat report published in April 2012. 
 
Figure 3: Total Number of Vulnerabilities identified, 2006 – 2011 
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More than 300 million security threats (to infect users’ computers) were 
detected by Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) in the first quarter of 2010, 
recording a 26% increase in attempts observed in the fourth quarter of 2009 
(Namestnikov 2010). 
On the other hand, bank fraud is on the increase as well. Phishing attacks 
and malware are considered a real threat to bank customers (O'sullivan 2009). 
Figures (released by the payments group APACS) in 2009 show that online bank 
threats in England cost customers approximately £52.5m, while card fraud losses 
total £609.9m. 
Information security is important in protecting critical infrastructures in 
both public and private sector businesses. In both sectors, information security 
will function as an enabler, e.g. to achieve e-government or e-business, and to 
avoid or reduce relevant risks. 
Security is not a one-time effort. Reviewing and monitoring the security 
plan is important to keep the organisation secure and safe. 
1.4 Methods of Attacks 
Based on the nature of the attack, targeted groups and successful 
methods of attack, researchers concluded that attacks against information and 
organisations can take many forms and can be categorised into the following  
types (Berg. 2006): 
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1.4.1 Technical Attacks 
This type of attack is carried out by software or malicious code to 
damage systems; it can take the form of a virus, a worm, a Trojan horse or some 
kind of spyware in order to slow down network traffic, stopping service (Denial 
of Service) or to gain valuable information. In this case attackers or hackers use 
tools such as assembly language and the power of the computer and networks to 
achieve their goals. Usually these tools (which are widely available on the 
Internet) are sent to users in the form of programmes as attachments to emails or 
sometimes as scripts embedded in harmful websites. 
To provide protection against this type of attack, antivirus, anti-spam, 
firewalls and IDS can be used. In addition, a VPN and encryption algorithm can 
be implemented to increase the security level of network environments. 
1.4.2 Social Engineering 
This type of attack could take the form of malicious actions against people, 
physical theft of laptops and computer equipment, phishing and shoulder surfing. 
Lack of knowledge and awareness are the main reasons behind the success of this 
type of attack knowing that people are the weakest link in the security chain (Barrett 
2003; Orgill, Romney et al. 2004; Berg. 2006; Gregg 2006). 
Different definitions of Social Engineering (SE) attacks have been 
demonstrated to describe one of the most serious security threats at the moment. 
Kevin Mitnick (the FBI’s most-wanted computer hacker) in his famous book 
“Art of Deception” defines social engineering as: 
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“Taking advantage of people’s naivety via influence, persuasion and 
manipulation to obtain vital information.”(Mitnick and Simon 2002). 
Meanwhile the security+ study guide refers to Social Engineering as: 
“The process of using human behaviour to attack a network or gain access to 
resources that would otherwise be inaccessible”(Hausman, Barrett et al. 2003). 
One of the simplest definitions is: 
 “Breaking an organisation’s security by interactions with 
people”(http://www.computeruser.com/ 2006). 
It is clearly noticeable that this kind of attack is performed wherever and 
whenever people are present; therefore it cannot be completely eliminated, but 
only reduced. Social engineers target companies’ information using different 
methods to gain their valuable information. 
1.5 Social Engineering Categories and Methods 
Social engineering attacks can be conducted in many diverse ways. 
Usually the first step in any social engineering attack is the collection of 
information with a company’s website being one of the main resources to gain 
such information. The attacker could collect the information from search 
engines, job sites or dumpster diving (Redmon 2006). 
Social engineering attacks have many different forms, the following are some 
common approaches widely used: 
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a.   Impersonation:  
Impersonation is imitating another person where the attacker can act as 
an authority figure or assume the identity of a lay user. People are usually 
intimidated by authorised persons, and this may lead them to reveal important 
information to the attacker. Additionally, attackers could use the phone to 
impersonate another person to collect information, or send a phishing email 
requesting users to update their accounts on the website (Schneier 2004; 
Redmon 2006). 
b.    Developing Trust 
Attackers could build trust between themselves and the victim to gain or 
exchange future information; this takes time to achieve and it may require 
several visits (to the targeted victim) to build such confidence. The main goal (of 
the attacker) during these visits is not to collect information, but to build trust. 
Kevin Mitnick considered building trust as a stage of the social engineering 
cycle  (Mitnick and Simon 2002). 
c.   Moral Duty 
People are used to helping other people or friends even if it means 
“breaking the rules”. This could occur among people working in teams, when an 
individual feels the need to show their helpful abilities to others. An employee 
could reveal a certain code or important document as a favour to a ‘friend’, who 
can be in this case the attacker him/her selves (George 2001). 
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d.   Urgency and Persuasion 
This method of collecting information can be implemented by leading 
the victims to think that, if they don’t give certain information quickly, 
disastrous consequences will overtake the requester (the attacker). Sometimes 
the attacker convinces the user that everyone else has given him/her this type of 
information as it is urgently needed; therefore, the user may easily be persuaded 
to reveal any requested information to the hacker (Granger 2001). 
e.  Spying  
Attackers could spy on the keyboard of the user to memorise passwords 
or pin codes of the access control lock. These actions are called shoulder surfing. 
Memorable passwords or short pin numbers can be easily observed by shoulder 
surfers. Because of this type of attack, people are advised to select long and 
strong passwords and to shield the key pad while they are typing the password 
or the pin code (Guyot 2003). 
1.6 Achieving Information Security and Reducing Social Engineering 
Attacks 
By building a strong security plan, the organisation can secure its 
information against various threats and minimise risk. 
A security plan is needed because security is not a standard procedure or 
a one-off task but an overlapping mesh of technology, people, policies and 
processes. A security plan will help co-ordinating the whole system and ensure 
there are no gaps; it will also give a sense of proportion and priority to different 
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tasks. There are four steps in creating a good security plan: Audit, Plan, Execute 
then Monitor and Repeat (Corporation 2003). 
It is preferable for any security plan to be based on security standards. 
ISO 17799 and COBIT are two of the most popular guidelines and 
recommendations to improve the security of information. Since security is not a 
product, monitoring and managing it is one of the important success factors (the 
security process 24/7). 
 
Figure 4: A continuous process of the Security Plan  
Social Engineering attacks can be reduced by implementing different 
security controls. Below are recommended solutions that can help to mitigate the 
risk of social engineering: 
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a. Policies 
Policies are one of the most important keys to successfully implementing 
security controls. Revising policies and procedures are usually the second stage 
of a security audit process (Kapp 2000) when the first stage is finding the 
policies. It is important for the enterprise to apply clear and strong policies, 
procedures and guidance, and enforce them in critical circumstances to reduce 
human error (Lo and Marchand 2004).  
b. Help Desk and Incident Management 
By handling security incidents, the level of risk should be reduced, and 
security policies will be more effective when there are immediate response 
actions (Symantic 2002). Help desk staff have the ability to reset users’ 
passwords, configure accounts, and allow or revoke permissions. Unfortunately, 
impersonating help disk staff could enable social engineering attacks (Redmon 
2006). 
c. Training and Awareness 
It is important to communicate the procedure and guidance to the 
company staff; this can be achieved by training people and conducting regular 
campaigns such as meetings, posters, leaflets and computer messages (Microsoft 
2006). Some companies require employees to review the policy every year and 
train new employees as soon as they start work (Gulati 2003). 
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d. Physical Security 
Valuable information should be protected against social engineering 
attacks. Information is stored either in servers or physically in cupboards. 
Physical security is one of the first lines of defence. The implementation of 
access control systems (such as fingerprints and ID cards) will make it difficult 
for social engineering attackers to operate in such a secured environment (Jones 
2004; Redmon 2006). 
e. Auditing 
Auditing and regular assessment of security policies, people’s awareness, 
and access control functionalities could reduce the risk level of technical and 
social engineering attacks. Addressing the vulnerabilities of computer systems 
has become a relatively straightforward exercise. The problem nowadays is how 
to audit and evaluate the security of people (Barrett 2003). 
1.7 What are Security Controls? 
The contents of a security plan (such as standards, policies, procedures 
and guidelines) are called Security Controls. 
Security controls are divided into three types. The first is management 
and administrative control, such as personnel security, policies, incident 
handling, security audits or disaster recovery plans. The second type is physical 
control, such as selecting secured sites, and securing the equipment or protection 
of unattended hardware. The last type is called technical control, such as 
antivirus software, user identification and authentication, access control, 
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firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (NIIT 2004; ISO 2005), the latter  is 
the most commonly used controls. 
1.8 Auditing and monitoring 
Auditing means to: “Carry out periodic reviews of security risks and 
implemented controls to take account of changes to business requirements and 
priorities, consider new threats and vulnerabilities, and confirm that controls 
remain effective and appropriate” (Milus 2004). 
Security auditing is a policy-based assessment of the procedures and 
practices of a site and assessing the level of risk created by these actions. It is an 
evaluation process of all security components of an organisation. It can measure 
and test for vulnerabilities and weaknesses in IT security systems, policies and 
procedures (Kapp 2000; Lo and Marchand 2004; Research 2004). 
 Companies that do not have security standards (or any form of 
implemented policies) are likely to have an unsuccessful audit process. 
1.9 Reactive vs. Proactive Systems 
The audit process described earlier can be categorised as a corrective 
process, as it analyses the current status of the security level of the enterprise 
and gives recommendations at the end of the procedure, though it can’t 
guarantee the implementation of those corrective actions. Nowadays many tools 
have been developed to monitor security issues in real time. These types of tools 
are categorised as detective tools, whilst preventive security controls are 
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considered the best solution as they can predict the risk and prevent breaches 
from ever occurring. 
The following diagram shows the costs and effectiveness of security 
control categories mentioned above (Sapronov 2005). 
 
Figure 5: Cost-effectiveness diagram of different security control types (Sapronov 2005) 
The above graph demonstrates that preventative controls are less costly 
and more effective than the detective and corrective controls. 
1.10 Human Factor in Information Security Process 
Security status cannot be guaranteed just by using security tools. The 
security process should amalgamate all elements: technology, people and 
policies. Social engineering attacks usually target weak people who lack 
knowledge; accordingly, the human factor is the main reason behind the success 
of many computer attacks. Therefore, interviewing people is an important stage 
in measuring and assessing their awareness in the security audit process (Lo and 
Preventive Detective Corrective
Cost
Effective
High Effective 
Low Effective 
High Cost 
Low Cost 
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Marchand 2004) hence monitoring their activities will definitely reduce the risk 
of such attacks. Social Engineering is a security gap that requires further 
investigation and should be addressed in future research. Internal end-users (who 
lack knowledge) could be the vulnerable part of a network infrastructure and 
cause great harm (Colwill 2010) accordingly, their activities should be 
monitored and observed in transparent mode. 
It becomes clear that people are the weakest link in the security process; 
thus it is an aim of this research to find a model that can integrate different types 
of security controls.  
1.11 Motivation 
Attackers prefer to violate security systems through end-users as they are the 
weakest link in the security chain. Lack of knowledge and negligence in security polices 
make them an easy target. Phishing and weak passwords are obvious examples of 
security vulnerabilities. 
The author’s experience in the computer section of the Public Works 
Department of the United Arab Emirates for ten years helped him to realise that all 
kinds of technologies implemented in that department (including firewalls, antivirus, 
VPN, restricted policies and procedures) failed to provide the organisation with the 
required security. As a result, the organisation remained under attack. Based on security 
audits and security gap analysis, it was concluded that more than 700 employees 
(computer users of that department) need to have a minimum level of security 
awareness in order to raise the overall security system level. Additionally, certain 
policies were enforced, such as selecting 8-character passwords, using a mix of different 
CHAPTER ONE 
16 
character sets, restricting end-users from installing programs, and making regular 
checks of personal computers scheduled on a monthly basis. The next security audit 
showed that security breaches had been reduced following six months of awareness 
program training and implementation of different security controls. 
 Despite that, other security breaches increased over the next few months, such as 
selecting weak passwords, receiving phishing emails and ignoring some security update 
software that had suddenly stopped its processes. Passwords are widely used nowadays 
as an authentication method. Many of end-users do not have enough security knowledge 
to be able to select strong passwords. On the other hand, emails are currently one of the 
most popular communication methods. Phishing emails are usually look like a 
legitimate ones in order to deceive people thus, social engineering attacks will only 
become consistent and successful in areas where people lack awareness and have poor 
proactive security systems. 
Essentially, people are responsible for building, implementing and operating the 
technology, making them very important players in the security process. The proposed 
model in this research, therefore, covers and focuses on integrating different security 
controls into an intelligent and effective control to diminish the risk of social 
engineering attacks and reduce the security gap caused by people. 
1.12 Aims and Objectives 
This research aims to integrate different security controls in a module that can 
avoid, counteract and minimise various security threats of social engineering attacks. 
There are three important elements affecting the run of any kind of business; 
people, product (technology) and process - sometimes partners are added as a fourth 
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element (Clinch May 2009). With reference to the ISO 17799, information security 
controls are categorised into different types: controls related to users, such as awareness 
programs; controls related to policies, such as the roles and procedures that are applied 
by organisations’ managements; and, finally, physical and technical controls such as 
antivirus, firewall, user authentication, and logical access controls. 
Based on the above, the following diagram (6) shows the three different types of 
information security control represented as the elements of business: 
 
Figure 6: Types of information security controls 
 One of the main objectives of this research is to build an integrated model to 
reduce the risk of social engineering attacks. This model can be applied at 
different levels at enterprises in order to plug the gap in security chains caused 
by human neglect.  
The suggested model starts as a result of an audit process taking place in 
the company in order to find the required actions. Stages of “What to do”, “How 
to do”, and “Why” are implemented in the proposed approach. Administrators 
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improve existing policies or write new ones (we call this stage “What to do”). 
The new and improved policies are represented as procedures through 
development of intelligent tools (such as server side tools or front-end modules). 
In order to enforce those polices, we need the stage of (“How to do”). Finally, 
the proactive intelligent tools will enforce the policies and recognise security 
threats before they happen. They then play the role of trainers as they will show 
the end-users reasons behind the decisions taken, such as why the password is 
weak or why the email is categorised as a phishing email. This is the stage of 
(“Why”). As security is a process not a product, a security audit should be a 
continuous process as argued by (Page 2003). Figure 7 represents the suggested 
model. It shows information security systems surrounded by one control that 
integrates administrators and end-users with policies and logical information 
security controls. All are subject to a security audit: 
 
Figure 7: Integration of people with policies and logical security controls 
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 The addition of new factors to measure password strength (in order to mitigate 
shoulder surfing attacks) should be taken into consideration because, as they 
become widely used, many existing tools are ignoring this factor. 
 One other important objective is to measure the strength of passwords 
effectively and accurately in order to force end-users to select strong passwords 
through an intelligent module. 
 Study the behaviour of phishing emails to prove that phishing emails can be 
detected by well-trained users. This can be done by separating the incoming 
emails into front and back ends, analysing each part on the basis of common 
phishing email features. 
 To build an efficient capture-of-phishing-emails tool based on the suggested 
integrated model. Fewer factors and rules will be used to enhance the module’s 
performance. Ultimately, users will be aware of the module’s decision through 
its awareness feature that this module constructs. 
 The literature shows substantial financial loses are taking place across many 
years due to social engineering attacks. 
1.13 Research Hypothesis 
 It is possible to improve security and reduce social engineering attacks by 
combining of different security controls. (ex. Logical/physical, Administration 
and human factors) 
 Password strength can be improved by considering a combination of affecting 
three factors - length of passphrase, entropy and dictionary-based to avoid social 
engineering shoulder surf attack. 
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 New factors related to password strength are exist and can be used to improve 
security and its definition. 
 More accurate quantitative value of password strength can be measured and used 
instead of its present qualitative one (“Weak”, “Moderate” and “Strong”). 
 Fuzzy logic can be used to improve password security measures. 
 Phishing emails capture can be improved by using fuzzy expert approach.  
 Improved detective tools are needed to detect visible or invisible phishing 
emails. 
 People can’t easily detect phishing emails. 
1.14 Methodology 
Methodology is "the strategy or architectural design by which the researcher 
maps out an approach to problem-finding or problem-solving" (Buckley, Buckley et al. 
1976).  Meanwhile, (Collis and Hussey 2003) stated that the purpose of research was to 
review or synthesise existing knowledge in order to generate new knowledge by 
exploring existing problems to provide solutions. Based on that, the framework of the 
methodology should address the problem-finding, then the problem-solving, via data 
collection and analysis, developing tools and procedures. Therefore, the methodological 
approach of this research (based on a comprehensive literature review, case-studies, 
tools implementation and interview) to define and address one of the current serious 
information security threats will be to adopt a quantitative approach based on artificial 
intelligent fuzzy logic systems. At the end of each experiment, a comparison study is 
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applied to validate the proposed models. Additionally, the author’s ten years of 
experience in a technical support section of a department of 1500 employees will add 
value to this research. This experience caused the author to realise the need for 
awareness programs and the enforcing of policies in order to reduce the risk of various 
security threats. 
The case-study focuses on real vulnerabilities of implemented security policies. 
This kind of study helps to address security gaps and serious problems in a short time 
since it is based on real experience. It is worth mentioning that an unstructured 
interview with an IT manager of a major bank in Jordan exposed a critical security 
breach at one of the largest banks in the region. 
The experiments conducted in this research require us to collect important data 
from different sources. A password dictionary (which contains more than 800,000 
English words including movies, brands, names and sequences of keyboard patterns 
added to it) has been used to help manipulate dictionary attacks. We are also required to 
collect real phishing emails to build the phishing capture intelligent tool. A set of 1200 
emails (including healthy and phishing emails) have been used in this research for 
analysis and comparison studies. 
At the end of each experiment a comparison study with various technologies is 
carried out in order to validate the proposed models. A constructed password checker 
(Ptool) is compared to Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and CertainKey password 
checkers. Meanwhile, the phishing capture model outcome is implemented in a tool that 
is compared to Microsoft Windows live mail 2009, Thunderbird email client and Avira 
antivirus. 
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Figure 8: Research Methodology 
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1.15 Contributions to knowledge 
This research has contributed to knowledge in the following areas: 
 A security framework is implemented to integrate the three main types of 
information security controls (people, procedures and physical) into an effective 
and integrated unit, which helps administrative and security personnel develop 
required policies that can then be integrated into software modules in order to 
enforce the said policies. Educational popup messages will help users 
understand the reasons for the decisions taken by the intelligent tools.  
 A new factor is added to measure strength of password, as a shoulder surfing 
attack is an easy attack with no risk to the attacker (Bidgoli 2008). Shoulder 
surfing attacks have been ignored by most existing password measuring tools; 
hence, they are addressed in this research, so that, strong password can be 
defined as the password that can resist Brute force, dictionary and shoulder 
surfing attacks 
 This study established a quantitative definition of password strength, since this 
kind of measurement not exists yet. 
 An integrated fuzzy model is implemented to measure strength of passwords 
using three factors - length of passphrase, entropy and dictionary- based; a 
quantitative measure is represented.  
 One of the outcomes of this study is defining password strength, therefore strong 
password can confront brute force, dictionary and shoulder surfing attacks. 
 This research concluded that email phishing attacks are visible attacks with more 
than 90% of detected phishing emails are easy to detect by human knowledge. In 
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other words, they can be avoided by implementing comprehensive awareness 
security training. 
 A new integrated model has been designed using a fuzzy expert system to 
capture phishing emails in two different layers to reduce the number of rules 
generated. The first layer is the visible layer (front end of the email) which 
consists of three main features of phishing emails (generic salutation, Security 
promises or require fast response and links to https:// domains ), then we have 
the invisible layer (back end of the email or the source code), this layer has three 
elements as well that are related to phishing emails (IP-Bases, Contain script and 
number of domains), after that, the output of the two fuzzy processes (front and 
back end), will be the input of new fuzzy process to get the final rate of the 
incoming email. 
 Finally, incoming emails are categorised into three different types, instead of 
inbox and junk box folders that are exist in most of the email client software; 
new folder has been added called suspicious inbox to store emails that look like 
legitimate emails but holding some phishing emails features.  
1.16 Thesis Map 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
1.16.1 Literature Review 
In chapter two, a comprehensive review focuses on different 
technologies and previous work related to this research. This literature review 
includes expert systems, fuzzy logic in information security, passwords and 
related measuring tools (existing in the market nowadays); it also addresses 
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(through research and discovering different phishing schemas and related 
researches) this important and serious problem. Finally, information security 
awareness programs are addressed as this is an important issue that should be 
taken into consideration during the security process.  
1.16.2 Case Study 
Chapter three contains case-studies focusing on four different sites. The 
first was an interview with an IT manager of a renowned bank in Jordan which 
was exposed to a serious virus attack few years ago. The interview focused on 
the absence of enforcement of security policies and negligence in implementing 
security controls such as strong password-measuring tools. The second was a 
summary study of the implementation of a security policy at an educational 
establishment, the aim of which was to focus on the importance of the 
integration of the information security control. Third case study is to find the 
potential of conducting an internal phishing attacks since there is a lake to 
implement a redistricted security policy. Finally, a simulation of phishing attack 
has been conducted, including awareness measurement and educational 
feedback survey, the main objective of this study is to measure the security 
awareness level of end-users and send an effective concise awareness massage 
to avoid a prospect phishing attacks through a case study. 
1.16.3 Intelligent Measuring Tools for Password Strength 
This module is a proactive password checker based on Rule-Fuzzy logic to 
avoid selecting weak passwords.  It helps users to gauge their password strength 
and generate a stronger password to comply with the organisation’s policies; it is 
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based on three factors in measuring password strength such as length, entropy and 
dictionary-based. The output of this module is categorised into three parts viz. 
weak, medium and strong. In each category the password is given a strength 
percentage which gives more accurate results. This module was developed and the 
results can be found in chapter 4. 
1.16.4 Email Phishing Capture Module 
In chapter five, the module analyses phishing emails by dividing the 
incoming email into two parts (back end and front then), then rating the 
incoming email through fuzzy logic approach. The email phishing model 
measures the risk of the content of any incoming email by comparing any 
embedded web addresses with the trusted web addresses in the database. 
Microsoft and Yahoo (the leaders of the email service providers) still experience 
problems in distinguishing between safe and phishing emails. Over the last few 
months the author has received fraudulent emails from Ebay and Paypal 
websites and various banks. The tool has managed to detect them all. 
The proposed solution will estimate the risk of the email through six 
main features divided into back and front ends. The back end features are 
invisible to the end-user whereas the front-end features are visible. Accordingly, 
the incoming email will be ranked as safe, unsafe and partially safe, depending 
on the content of the email. The user will be able to save the trusted websites on 
a secured database. 
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1.16.5 Findings and future works 
This chapter provides the final conclusion of this research and sets out the 
potential for implementing the proposed model in different areas of information 
security systems. 
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2 Literature Review  
Information security is an important component of the IT management process. 
It is the way to protect information from a wide range of threats in order to preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of any business (Whitman and Mattord 2012).  
Social engineering is a serious threat which targets people; it has started to alarm 
administrators and technicians who believe that tools are the only solution to mitigate 
security risks (Emirsk 2009). Research and case-studies have addressed the fact that 
people are the weakest link in the security process, which is why they are usually the 
preferred target of professionals (Okenyi and Owens 2007). Amanda Andress states 
that, in order to keep the security infrastructure effective, it is important not to ignore 
people and processes when spending money on technology (Andress 2003), because 
products are not enough to build  secure IT systems.  
In this literature review we will cover the importance of social engineering 
attacks and the proposed solutions to reduce the risk of this kind of threat; we will then 
undertake a comprehensive study of shoulder surfing attacks of passwords and email 
phishing, both of which are two patterns of social engineering threats. After that we 
discuss the usage of expert systems in information security, focusing on fuzzy logic as 
that is the technology on which our model is based. Later on, a summary study about 
the importance of security awareness and training is proposed. 
2.1 Social Engineering Attacks 
Tim Thornburgh (Thornburgh 2004 ) argued for the importance of 
information, especially “who accesses what information”. To access any 
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information, the user should be required to pass the IAA steps (Identification, 
Authentication and Authorisation). The author concentrated on physical security 
and passwords because of their importance. It can be noted that the social 
engineering process has a life cycle; it begins with research, rapport and trust, 
exploiting trust and the utilising of the collected information. Social engineers 
are usually looking for certain information such as user names, network structure 
and applications that run on a specific server. By implementing an effective 
incident response system, subsequent attacks may be prevented. In addition to 
that, policies, procedures, training and awareness programs may secure the 
organisation against social engineering attacks. 
Gregory L (et al) (Orgill, Romney et al. 2004)  conducted a case-study by 
simulating an attack to an organisation using  social engineering techniques their 
methodology based on  performing unnoticed a security audit within that 
organisation. The problem within social engineering auditing is the lack of 
materials that can be used for this type of auditing. The audit process consists of 
many phases. Figure 9 shows the steps taken to conduct this case-study. 
 
Figure 9: Steps taken to conduct a simulation SE attack 
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Firstly, the attacker obtained a permission from the top management to 
conduct this audit. Then they started collecting information about the 
organisation through the website of the organisation and by visiting the offices. 
After that they used a survey consisting 8 questions to measure the awareness of 
employees. The trick behind this survey is the questions themselves. The 
answers to the questions can lead to a real risk to the information system within 
the organisation. Two of the questions asked for the user names and passwords. 
After the completion of the audit they discovered that 60% of the employees had 
submitted their passwords to the auditor and 81% their usernames. This result 
disturbed the management of the organisation who changed the policies to 
strengthen their security systems. First, they started educating the employees on 
the danger of releasing usernames and passwords to unknown people. Then a 
new multi-factor authentication system was implemented to avoid physical 
access by unauthorised people.  
Barrett (Barrett 2003) discussed how to devise a suitable methodology 
for evaluating the security of people. The audit process (in his opinion) is not 
enough to ensure the security level. A focused penetration test is a reliable way 
of obtaining reassurance. If the results of the penetration testing are successful, 
that indicates vulnerability in the system. The author’s methods of penetration 
testing were: first, to use tools to attempt to break into and access systems and, 
second, to use social engineering to gain important information to access those 
systems. He used two methods to mount social engineering attacks - a simple 
auditing process, by locating potential targets and identifying the weaknesses in 
order to exploit them. 
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Based on last two case-studies by Gregory L (et al) and Barrett, it is noted 
that people could be the weakest link of security chain; anti-virus and firewalls 
will not prevent exposing the systems. Awareness and educational programs 
help organisation to mitigate the risk of social engineering attacks 
2.2 Password Strength 
Millions of people manage their accounts and protect their documents on 
a daily basis. The most common method of authentication and protection is to 
use a username and password (Schneier 2004; Xiaoyuan, Ying et al. 2005) 
simultaneously. However, the American cryptographer Schneier argues that 
using passwords is an insecure method to protect offline systems. This is due to 
that crackers can now break any systems, he stated that using passwords much 
better on the internet since brute force and dictionary attacks are working best 
offline (Schneier 2004); hence selecting strong passwords is very important part 
of to the security process in order to protect privacy. Computer users need to 
know how to select strong passwords or they should use a measurement tool to 
gauge the strength of their passwords. A case-study conducted by (Adams and 
Sasse 1999)  showed that many users created their own rules for password 
selection  which may lead to weak passwords. 
The term ‘strong password’ is not defined. One of the outcomes of this 
study is defining password strength. Users and people in general are normally 
not aware how passwords are cracked (Adams and Sasse 1999). Presently, 
hackers use many techniques to gain or crack weak passwords. Brute-force 
attack, which depends on testing all possibilities, is one of the infamous 
techniques. The new computer processing power helped to perform millions of 
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trials in a few minutes (Technology 2006) A dictionary is widely used by 
password crackers to break into protected documents since most computer users 
are using common passwords or names for passwords (Kenneth Allendoerfer 
2005). The final technique is the shoulder surfing attack which may happen in 
crowded areas such as internet cafes, airports and computer labs. 
The concept of entropy was introduced by Shannon in 1948 as part of the 
information theory, is defined as “a measure of the uncertainty associated with a 
random variable” (Ihara 1993) 
Password strength can be measured in bits, this measurement concept 
constructed from the information theory. Therefore Instead of the number of 
guesses needed to find the password, the base-2 logarithm of that number is 
used which is the number of "entropy bits" (William E. Burr, Donna F. Dodson 
et al. 2006). 
Therefore, to avoid the aforementioned techniques, security experts agree 
that strong passwords shouldn’t be based on dictionary words, should have 
sufficient entropy to avoid time crack techniques (Gehringer 2002) and should 
be fully random to evade shoulder surfing attacks.  
Many researchers and vendors have developed different methodologies 
and tools to measure the strength of passwords. Bergadano (et al) (Bergadano, 
Crispo et al. 1997 ) used a decision tree to classify passwords as “good” or 
“bad”. The experiment was performed on passwords of 8 characters and very 
highly compressed dictionaries. The aim of this research is to find passwords 
that are partially based on a dictionary or a meaningful word with some 
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modification. Meanwhile Duffy and Jagota (Nigel and Arun 2002) presented a 
connectionist algorithm for testing the quality of passwords by comparing a 
given password against a large dictionary of words and near-words. They used a 
compact dictionary stored on the network in distributed form to achieve high 
performance in testing passwords. 
Jeff Yan (Jianxin Jeff 2001) used entropy to measure the strength of 
passwords. His method depends on exploiting effective patterns to prevent low-
entropy passwords. The experiment was conducted on 7-character length 
passwords. 
A machine learning approach to measure a password strength was 
proposed by (Vijaya MS et al, 2009). It was improved by using a combination 
of different techniques such as Naïve Bayes classifier, Decision tree classifier, 
Multilayer perception. In addition, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) is applied 
to train the password strength analysis model. Passwords Features are then 
extracted from a set of 10,000 passwords based on different categories. In order 
to simplify the training and implementation, the data set of passwords are 
generated by a Pc Tools password generator provided by Symantec, a tool that 
is being used widely to generate strong passwords. 
Many websites provide internet users with measurement tools to test 
their passwords. Other websites (such as Google and Yahoo) apply a password 
strength meter at the time of creating or updating the password. 
Microsoft has developed a web-based tool to measure the strength of 
passwords (Microsoft 2006). The password rating is divided into four 
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categories: “Weak”, “Medium”, “Strong”, and “Best”. By testing many 
passwords it seems that Microsoft doesn’t consider shoulder sniffing attacks 
against passwords, e.g., the password “Aaaaaaa1” measured as strong 
password when was tested in August 2006 and Aug 2010, while 
“bdztksqfpvwsx” was measured as weak. Basically, the first password 
complies with the rules of; having small and capital letters and includes 
number. It is not however sufficiently random hence it can be easily memorised 
or captured by a shoulder surfing attacker. Miller stated that people can 
remember 7 ±2 characters of a given chunk of symbols (Miller 1956); therefore 
any shoulder attacker can memorise this password at first glance. We can 
conclude that the first password is easy to remember, but the second one is fully 
randomised and needs a long time to crack (it needs around 26^13 probabilities 
i.e. ~ 64bits, which makes it stronger than the first one which needs 62^8 
probabilities i.e. ~ 48 bits). 
CertainKey Cryptosystems is a security company specialising in 
security and cryptosystems to secure small and medium-sized business 
networks. The Pass-phrase Strength Analyser is a commercial product for 
testing the strength of passwords; one can test it online before purchasing 
(CertainKey 2006). The results of testing a password depend on the number of 
days needed to crack the password or pass phrases. If the password needs more 
than approximately 300 days it passes the test. Otherwise the result will be 0 
days to crack with a red cross – as conducted on 29thMay, 2011). 
By using a dictionary, calculating the entropy of the password 
“Qwerty123” and using a mixture of character sets (consisting of capitals, 
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small characters and a number), this word will takes around 4505 days to crack. 
The reader may notice that this word is an easy one to remember; hence, from a 
shoulder surfing point of view, this password is not secure enough. 
On the other hand, the password “WE3r$tv^4g34&Sky” (which is 16 
characters long) has failed the test because it is partially based on the dictionary 
word “sky” at the end of it. Actually the first 13 characters of this password are 
fully random with high entropy. 
By testing this portion of the password we can get a very strong password 
that will require millions of days to crack. Adding a small meaningful word to a 
complicated phrase shouldn’t affect the strength of the password before the 
addition, while the entropy should be increased.  
When one visits the Google website to open an email account or to 
change the password, a strength meter appears beside the password textbox. 
The passwords on the Google website are rated as “Too short, “Weak”, “Fair”, 
“Good”, and “Strong”. When testing many passwords in August 2006 and 
August 2010, it is noticed that very weak passwords were rated as strong. This 
can be demonstrated by using the password “zxcv11” in 2006, while the 
password “159632111” (tested in 2010) was rated as strong, though not too 
long, memorable and with low entropy – it is a keyboard sequence with a 
repeated number! 
Yahoo is a renowned internet service provider which integrates a 
measurement tool (comprising four green boxes to indicate the password 
strength) that appears alongside the password box, when the user attempts to 
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create an account or update a password. The final rating is divided into 4 levels; 
one red box means too short, two yellow boxes means weak, 3 green boxes 
means strong while a very strong password is indicated by 4 green boxes. A 
password of 6 characters such as “Aaaa11” is rated as a very strong password, 
while the password “vjfheijdjueudosk” which has 16 characters length is 
rated as a weak password. We noticed that the second password takes ages to 
crack (using brute force attack) and it is very hard for any person to glance at or 
memorise this password using a shoulder surfing attack - this password is 
unbreakable by normal attack whereas the first password “Aaaa11”, is easy, 
simple and breakable. 
Finally, a similar test has been applied to the Facebook password 
strength meter. On Facebook, one of the most famous social networks in the 
world with more than 900 million users (Carlson May 2012) hence, privacy is an 
important matter at their site. The password “vjfheijdjueudosk” which 
was tested on Yahoo as weak and was rated as weak at Facebook as well, but the 
password “Aaaa11” was rated as weak. However, by adding more characters to 
it, the password “Aaaaaa11” has become a strong one even though it can be 
easily memorised compared with the first one that was extremely hard to 
remember. 
In conclusion, the author noticed that all available tools related to 
password strength are actually not based on clear measuring criteria. It is also 
noticed that no quantitative definition of password strength exists; something 
that this study has managed to establish. 
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2.3 Email Phishing 
Phishing attacks target people rather than systems. In order to fraud or 
breach into other systems and compromise people’s privacy, it exploits the 
weakness of end users and aims to collect user information such as passwords, 
account numbers, credit card details, social security numbers, date of birth and 
more (Tyler Moore and Clayton 2007) (Engin Kirda 2005) 
Several techniques have been proposed to solve this problem. Unfortunately, this 
type of problem depends on human awareness. Therefore, the phishing detection 
algorithm should not be based completely on user interaction (Ian Fette June 
2006). Since phishing exploits human vulnerabilities rather than software 
vulnerabilities, education and awareness are the first step to mitigate the risks of 
phishing attacks (Larcom and Elbirt 2006; Yue Zhang 2007). 
Three types of solutions can be used to reduce the risk of phishing attacks:  
2.3.1 Anti-phishing Toolbars 
Ebay, NetCraft, GeoTrust, EarthLink, CallingID and other vendors offer 
several toolbars to lessen the risks of phishing attacks. These organisations use 
different methods to determine the legitimacy of websites such as checking the 
IP address, combination of heuristics, user ratings, and manual verification 
(2007; Yue Zhang 2007). 
2.3.2 Browser Plug-ins 
Microsoft has added a new plug-in to IE7 to help users detect phishing 
websites. It relies on a blacklist hosted by Microsoft.  Another tool from 
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SpoofStick is a simple browser extension that helps users to detect fake 
websites. SpoofStick makes it easier to spot a spoof website by prominently 
displaying only the most relevant domain information (2005). The Netscape 
Navigator 8.1 web browser includes a built-in phishing filter. Firefox 2.0 
includes a new feature designed to identify fraudulent websites (Yue Zhang 
2007). 
2.3.3 Email-Filters 
Email filters are the most effective solution for detecting spoof websites, 
since most victims are directed to spoof websites by phishing emails (Liu, 
Guanglin et al. 2005). By detecting spoofed emails, the user is more secure and 
the solution, in this case, is categorised as a preventive solution, while the 
toolbars and browser plug-ins are detective techniques. Ian Fette et al proposed a 
simple technique (to detect spoof emails) called PILFER (Ian Fette June 2006). 
The filter works by incorporating features specifically designed to highlight the 
deceptive methods used to fool users. Other researchers classify the email based 
on structural features such as the number of words in the email, the structure of 
the subject line, and the presence of 18 keywords that usually exists in phishing 
emails (M. Chandrasekaran, K. Karayanan et al. 2006). Thunderbird is email 
client software from Mozilla includes scam and phishing detection capabilities 
(Mozilla 2010). Other security suits include such filters that integrate with 
outlook such as Norton internet security suits, Avira and Microsoft Live email. 
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2.4 Introduction to Expert Systems 
Expert Systems are defined as: “Computer programs that are derived 
from a branch of computer science research called Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
AI's scientific goal is to understand intelligence by building computer programs 
that exhibit intelligent behaviour. It is concerned with the concepts and methods 
of symbolic inference, or reasoning, by a computer, and how the knowledge is 
used to make those inferences will be represented inside the machine” 
(Engelmore and Feigenbaum 1993). Expert systems have been widely used in 
several scientific fields such as medical, engineering and computer applications. 
Knowledge Based Systems, Fuzzy Logic, Case-Base Reasoning, Neural 
Networks and Data Mining are major technologies that make up the field of 
Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems 
2.5 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy Logic was conceived by Lotfi Zadeh (in the 60s) who presented 
data by allowing partial set membership rather than crisp set membership 
(Kaehler 1998). This is used widely in network security and security risk 
assessment to measure the exact value of the security status (Luo, Bridges et al. 
2001; Shi, Li et al. 2004; Dong-Mei, Jing-Hong et al. 2005). It is easy to 
understand, close to human thinking and depends on expert knowledge 
(Negnevitsky 2005). Fuzzy Logic works as a human language to describe the 
characteristics of a process with terms such as probably, unlikely, quite near etc 
(Gordon and Jorgensen 1998). 
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Xingjian Shi(et al)(Shi, Li et al. 2004) estimated the network security 
state exactly. Shi and his team used a fuzzy set and membership function for the 
input. They used the latter and the predefined fuzzy rule to arrive at the fuzzy 
conclusion. The detectors collected the raw data from a network, and then 
audited them using their own rules. The pre-treatment unit fuzzes those results 
into a fuzzy set and passes it to an inference unit which is communicating with 
a rule unit to influence the result. Ultimately, the conclusion base stores the 
final results. The input of the fuzzy set can be captured from the output of the 
network detectors which are already running in the organisation to monitor 
network traffic.  
Dong-Mei, Zhao (et al) used Fuzzy  Logic and Entropy theory to 
estimate the degree of the Information Security risk by using analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) (Dong-Mei, Jing-Hong et al. 2005). Since the risk of 
information security is mutable and uncertain, they used fuzzy logic to estimate 
then degree of risk of different security threats such as cheating the password, 
illegal visits, data leaking, destroying equipment etc. 
2.6 Security Awareness and Training  
The gap between security awareness programs and technical security 
tools is large. Companies and financial firms should strike a balance between the 
different elements of security controls (Andress 2003). End users are the 
weakest link within the security infrastructure, the lack of knowledge leads non-
technical users to harm networks in different ways such as selecting weak 
password, visiting websites infected with malware, responding to phishing e-
mails, or even releasing sensitive information over the phone when exposed to 
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social engineering attacks (Brodie 2008). Security awareness training should be 
conducted at all levels of the enterprise (including employees and executive 
management) at least annually because situations and policies change (Wold 
March 2006). A study conducted by (D'Arcy, Hovav et al. 2009) at different 
companies suggested that user awareness of security policies is vital; security 
education, training, and awareness are three practices that prevent information 
system misuse. Designing and implementing a security awareness program is 
not a straightforward task; it is difficult and frustrating (Herold 2010) since 
dealing with computer boxes is simpler than dealing with humans. Information 
security specialists state that, in order to improve information security 
effectiveness within organisations, their recommendation was to encourage good 
end-user behaviours and limit bad end-user behaviours (Jeffrey M. Stantona, 
Kathryn R. Stama et al. 2005). Awareness programs should be performed 
through four steps as in figure 10 in order to achieve the goals and success of 
such awareness programs. First of all, the program structure should be 
constructed by assessing the users’ needs; this will help to determine the training 
goals and the target audience. The next step is to develop or purchase awareness 
materials in any form such as training sessions, posters, guidance, or policies. 
The materials should be easy to use, scalable to large audiences, and provide a way 
to track who is using them. After that, the program should takes place with full 
management support. Finally, it is very important to measure the effectiveness of 
the implemented program through a regular audit team (Mark Wilson and Hash 
2003). 
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Figure 10: Steps to implement a security awareness program (Mark Wilson and Hash 2003) 
Implementing an information security awareness program does not 
guarantee that all employees will understand their role in ensuring the security 
and safeguarding of information and information assets. Assessing the 
awareness program is an important practice in order to address the weaknesses 
of such programs. A suggested prototype model by (Kruger and Kearney 2006) 
makes use of a simple data-gathering process and weighting system and 
combined with certain multi-criteria problem solution techniques to provide a 
quantitative measurement of security awareness levels. 
2.7 Conclusion: 
Information security threats are serious problems that can expose enterprises 
and internet environments as well as individuals to different forms of risks. In 
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addition to that, threats are continuously growing yearly. Social engineering attacks 
are one of the most serious menaces at the moment, since it is targeting the systems 
through the weakest link in the security chains; the human element. The two forms 
of social engineering attacks that we discussed in this review are shoulder surfing 
and phishing emails threats; the first one is a serious problem that has not been 
taken into considerations seriously by both; security systems solutions providers 
and researchers. As a result, losing millions of US Dollars is imminent. This matter 
has caused consumers to fear and losses of confidence in the e-service. 
Expert systems used widely in different fields nowadays. Recently, 
computer solutions including intrusion detection systems, anti-virus, learning 
systems, decision making algorithms. etc, depends on  various expert systems such 
as knowledge based systems, fuzzy logic, data mining, neural networks and wide 
range of artificial intelligence techniques.  
In this research a security framework is implemented using fuzzy logic 
expert system to integrate the three main types of information security controls 
(people, procedures and physical) in order to reduce the risk of two major forms; 
social engineering attacks including shoulder surfing and phishing emails. The 
suggested integrated model helps to develop the required policies that can be 
integrated into software modules in order to enforce security policies in both; 
public and commercial establishments. Educational popup messages in the form of 
feedback will help users understand the reasons behind all decisions taken by the 
intelligent tools. 
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3 Case Study 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial organisations are one of the main sectors targeted by hackers 
nowadays. Additionally, around 60% of information security breaches (in 
organisations in 2005) were found because of human mistakes. Researchers found that 
people are the weakest link in the security chain (Peter Hoonakker 2009). In order to 
address the impact of the absence of a security policy and the failure to implement any 
part of a security policy, both of which could lead to security breaches. This chapter 
will discuss three different case-studies. The first one is an interview with an IT 
manager of one the major banks in Jordan; it highlights a serious security breach that 
was about to negatively affect the bank’s reputation. The second case-study analyses a 
password policy in an educational organisation. The final case-study is an experiment 
in conducting an internal phishing attack. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that slackness in implementing basic 
security policy could leave organisations vulnerable to different kind of attacks, while 
leniency and neglecting Information Security Policies can cause serious breach of the 
system. Accordingly, forcing security policy is taken seriously in some organisations. 
On the other hand, serious attacks such as phishing have succeeded in penetrating 
systems due to lack of security awareness among employees; in addition to that, 
security policies need to take into consideration the new and evolving methods of 
cyber-attacks such as social engineering. 
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3.2 A case-study about a severe security breach at a major bank in 
Jordan 
3.2.1 Objectives 
The case-study aims to address the following objectives:  
a. Study the impact of reluctance to implement security policies. 
b. Importance of security awareness paradigm among employees. 
3.2.2 Methodology and introduction to the problem 
This case study is based on a direct interview with the IT manager in one 
of the major banks in Jordan which faced a serious security breach in 2009. For 
the purpose of this study and to preserve confidentiality, we will be calling this 
bank “Bank X”, and the manager’s names will be concealed. 
This study has shed a light on the bank in discussion in Jordan, which has 
about 50 branches distributed around Jordan and the region with approximately 
1,500 employees and half a million clients. Bank X has led the financial services 
industry in Jordan and beyond for around 50 years.  
3.2.3 Security status before 2009 
Most security specialists divide security controls into three main types as 
in the following diagram (Olzak 2011): 
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Figure 11: three major types of information security controls 
As a financial enterprise, this bank spent hundreds of thousands of dollars 
building a solid IT infrastructure including hardware and software firewalls, anti-
virus VPN to connect their 45 branches, intrusion detection systems, intrusion 
prevention systems, encryption devices and many other measures. The bank has 
several security policies but, unfortunately, most of them were not implemented 
properly and in many cases they were neglected or implemented improperly; 
according to their IT manager. 
The software side was secured by a multi-layer authentications procedure 
where those end-users who were authorised to use the financial software were 
forced to access it through four passwords: power-on password, operating system 
password, core banking system password, and the login to a specific banking 
module. According to the audit process (conducted in 2009) it was observed that 
more than 90% of the bank users were using an easy password such as 123 and 
1234! 
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The bank IT department emphasised on the physical security controls but 
did not impose the other two controls as expressed in figure 11.The importance 
of dealing with the human factor and ensuring that the security policies and 
procedures were properly implemented in order to fully secure the organisation 
were ignored. As far as we know, people are the weakest link in the security 
process hence they are likely to be targeted by hackers (Schneier 2000). 
The following is a list of security controls which should have been 
implemented (but were not): 
- Regular security awareness program 
- Implementing a complex password authentication policy 
- Some of the vital policies were not enforced properly such as internet policy 
and password authentication policy. 
- Misconfiguration of some of the procedure implementation 
- Lack of antivirus and prevention system monitoring. The audit process, for 
example, revealed huge carelessness regarding the antivirus definition 
automatic update 
- Access control policies regarding the back-end server room were not 
implemented and applied 
3.2.4 Identifying the problem 
The problem started when some users found their user accounts had been 
locked. The technical support staff mistakenly concluded that an incorrect 
password had been entered by the user and did not pay any serious attention to 
the problem. At the end of the day, complaints regarding locked accounts 
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increased dramatically to hundreds; the problem at this stage became more 
serious and precarious. 
The network team investigated the locked accounts on the server side to 
better identify the source of the problem.  They checked all back-end servers 
such as database, web servers and Unix servers in addition to switches, routers 
and other network components. During that stage it was noticed that the 
bandwidth traffic was seriously low and sometimes down.  Within 24 hours, the 
network team had declared the problem as a Conficker worm attack. 
According to the Symantec Corporation, the worm Conficker has 
different effects on systems, and when computers are compromised by 
Conficker they are unable to access external sites. As a result, users have to 
download Conficker removal tools (Symantec 2009). On the other hand, the 
Conficker worm can also disable important services on infected computers, so 
systems will not be able to work. This has led to the infection of the bank’s 
applications and additional breaches of the security systems have took place 
(Micrsoft 2009). 
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Figure 12: An illustration of how the Conficker worm works (Micrsoft 2009) 
According to Microsoft, the Conficker worm works using dictionary 
attacks to access the systems. As explained in the following figure 12, it can be 
noted that the Conficker worm works properly when there is slackness in the 
implementation of password and authentication policies. In addition, computers 
without the latest security updates and with out-of-date antivirus protection are 
likely to be infected by the worm. 
The worm attack took place and succeeded on the basis of two breaches. 
In the first instance, no password and authentication policy was enforced (the 
audit process found that more than 90% of users were using weak passwords 
such as 123). Subsequently, on the server side, the antivirus protection failed to 
update the client’s workstations with the latest security updates. Secondly, no 
monitoring procedure was applied to observe the update of security applications. 
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Consequently, the bank had two main back doors that allowed the attack to 
succeed: 
1 – No password and authentication policy was enforced. 
2 – Lack of security awareness, since more than 90% of users used very weak 
passwords. 
3.2.5 The solution 
In order to recover the locked accounts, enable the stopped services, 
continue the bank services, restore the privacy of thousands of clients and keep 
the reputational risk low, the network team decided to go through parallel 
solutions: 
First of all, the technical team traced the virus in order to disable its 
effects. The worm slackens network traffic, so it was important to reduce its 
effects. This solution (tracing the virus) is considered a corrective one. 
Secondly, the team went through proactive solutions by enforcing all 
policies related to the authentication process such as password length, password 
life, and multilayer authentication. In addition, a security awareness program was 
established in order to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information at both; the technical and end-user levels. A proper and effective 
security awareness program allows end-users to observe IT security threats and 
respond within the appropriate time and in the right way (Mark Wilson and Hash 
2003). 
CHAPTER THREE 
51 
Implementing and enforcing new polices were faced by many constraints. 
The two major difficulties noticed were: 
 The technical team took around 12 weeks to provide training to around 1000 
employees in the organisation. 
 Furthermore, since most of the users (95% of the bank’s customers) were 
using what could be described as weak passwords such as ‘123’ or ‘abc’. 
The new password policy has managed to force users to have a password of 
8 or more characters using a blend of upper and lower case together with 
numeric characters. Users considered this a challenge exercise that in turn 
kept the technical helpdesk initially occupied with the re-setting of 
passwords. 
3.2.6 Security status after 2009 
This attack forced top management to establish a security department 
office dedicated to manage and audit all security policies and procedures. The 
security and compliance personnel established and ensured all information 
security components are to include people, physical and administrative controls. 
Nowadays the bank has a regular awareness program conducted by the 
information security officers. Additionally, a regular biannual security audit is 
carried out to address any security gaps and other potential threats aiming to 
improve and sustain the implementation of the security plan. 
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3.3 A Case-Study of a password policy in an educational organisation  
3.3.1 Objective: 
The objective of the study is to assess and analysis the email password 
policy efficiency in educational organisations based on privacy issues and the 
name of the organisation whether it is a veiled one. 
3.3.2 Introduction and methodology 
Our case-study examines an academic organisation which has thousands 
of email accounts of both; staff and students. Protecting such emails is important 
to that organisation as well as to their staff and students.  The organisation has 
appropriate policies and procedures to reduce security vulnerabilities that could 
breach the system. 
By accessing the webpage of the email portal, users could download the 
password guidance which includes the security policy and guidance for selecting 
strong passwords. 
The methodology adopted as part of this study is to rigorously test 
passwords in order to ensure their compliance with the organisation’s password 
policy and guide lines. 
3.3.3 Organisation’s policy and guidance 
The password policy, which can be found on the password change page, 
states: “Passwords should contain at least one number, one small and one 
capital letter and be 8 characters long...e.g Qwerty12”, as shown on figure 13. 
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Figure 13: password change page shows the enforced policy 
The policy guidance states:  
a) A password MUST be 8 characters long and MUST contain at least one number 
and one UPPER case letter. It MUST NOT contain more than 3 repeated 
characters. 
b) DO use a password with non-alphabetic characters, eg digits or punctuation 
marks. 
c) DO use a password that is easy to remember, so that you DON'T NEED TO 
WRITE IT DOWN. 
d) DO use a password that you can type in quickly. 
e) DON'T use your username in any form (as is, reversed, capitalised, doubled, 
etc). 
f) DON'T use your first name or last name in any form. 
g) DON'T use anyone else’s name. 
h) DON'T use other easily-obtained information about yourself (eg car registration, 
street name, telephone number). 
i) DON'T use a word contained in a dictionary, spelling list, or other list of words. 
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3.3.4 Assessing the policy 
It was noticed that students were unable to change their passwords when 
off campus – this facility is only available at the university. Part-time students 
are not able to change their passwords overseas!  
Secondly, the following passwords have been tested and they comply 
with the organisation’s policy: 
Ser. Password Description 
1 Qwerty11 Keyboard sequence 
2 Aaaaaaa1 Repeated key 
3 Abcdefg1 Alphabet 
4 AA1salem Last 5 characters included from the username 
5 Zxcv1234 Sequences of keyboard keys and numbers 
6 English1 Famous known word with number 
7 Qq123456 Ends with sequence of numbers 
 Table 2: Various passwords tested 
Noticeably, all passwords in table 2 can be easily memorised and 
vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks. The above passwords comply with the 
organisation’s policy in that they are all 8 characters long and contain capital 
and small letters and numbers! 
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3.4 Potential of conducting an internal phishing attack 
3.4.1 Objective 
The main goal of conducting this case-study is to find out the potential of 
conducting an internal phishing attack at the same educational organisation 
where we carried out the previous case-study. 
3.4.2 Introduction 
Phishing attacks are web-based tricks that lead victims  (end-users, 
students, buyers) to reveal passwords or other important credentials such as 
credit card numbers or any other sensitive information (Basnet, Mukkamala et al. 
2008). They are conducted by using misleading (fake) web pages and emails that 
look legitimate. One of the most unusual and dangerous phishing attack methods 
is when the attack is conducted internally using the same domain as the targeted 
website. For instance, if the intruder uses what appears to be an authorised 
domain together with a fake email to give a false impression to the user, who 
logs on to the phishing web page resulting the user inadvertently provides their 
bona fide details. 
A personal file space is allocated for each student where they can store 
their personal files, assignments, research papers, and other works. Students are 
able to build a personal website to present their work using a default password 
given to any registered student based on their date of birth and consist of 6 digits 
in “ddmmyy” format (eg. 210578 to represent 21/05/1978). 
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According to our investigation, the organisation’s policy does not force 
students to change their passwords when they first log in. An attacker could 
exploit this with a  social engineering attack since finding people’s dates of birth 
is a common, simple method using social engineering techniques such as 
Pretexting (FTC February 2006 ). People are encouraged not to reveal their 
sensitive information including date of birth, national security number or other 
financial information under any circumstances (US-CERT 2011; Association 
July 2008). 
3.4.3 Elements of conducting an internal phishing attack  
The environment of the organisation under consideration has the main 
elements needed to establish a successful phishing attack. The following diagram 
shows the main steps of planning, designing, establishing and applying the 
phishing attack in this educational organisation. 
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Figure 14: Phishing Attack Scenario 
1) The attacker usually starts by studying the targeted network and the potential 
for conducting the phishing attack, finding a web page that will be the 
potential counterfeit page - in this case studying the target page which is the 
webmail server page.  
2) Secondly, the attacker needs to discover the novel network password in order 
to access the personal web space of the student to build the counterfeit email 
page. As mentioned above, students are given 6-digit date-of-birth default 
passwords at the time of registration. According to interviews with some 
students, they admit to their intention of not to change these passwords and 
never did in their three years of study. Actually, they have no idea how to do 
it. 
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A simple and smart social engineering dialogue is needed to obtain the date 
of birth of any person. The following discussion led the victim (student) to 
reveal the date of birth: 
 Attacker: Hello, how are you? 
 Victim: Good, thanks. 
 Attacker: Happy Birthday, I hope you have a great day! 
 Victim: But, today is not my birthday, I was born on (21
st
 Sep). 
 Attacker: Oops, I was confused between your date of birth and another friend’s.  
 Victim: It is ok, no problem. 
 Attacker: So, on 21
st
 Sep you will be 31 years old. 
 Victim: No, I will be 33.  
According to this dialogue, the victim’s date of birth can be easily 
calculated. Other methods could be used to obtain it, such as using a Facebook 
account or conducting a phishing call (Mitnick and Simon 2002). 
3) Once the intruder captures the password, the phishing attack becomes easier; 
the next step is to design the fake website (step 3a) and then send the 
phishing email (step 3b). 
4) The users respond to the phishing emails in different ways (Downs, 
Holbrook et al. 2007); they either respond to the phishing email by clicking 
on the fake website (step 4a) or report the phishing email to technical 
support (step 4b). They may also ignore the email (step 4c). 
5) If the email is reported to the technical support team or to the help desk, the 
suspicious website will be blocked immediately (step 5b). It’s recommended 
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that such emails be reported to APWG (reportphishing@apwg.org)  (APWG 
2012). 
But, should the user respond to the email by clicking on the link that leads to 
the fake website, it is most likely that the attacker will collect the credentials of 
the user if they try to login (step 5a). 
6) Finally, the hacker will be able to use the username and the password of the 
victim to access the legitimate website using valid credentials (step 6a and 
6b). 
According to this case-study, we can conclude the following facts: 
1. Users are allocated web-space for research and backup purposes. 
2. The password policy does not force the users to change their passwords at 
first login, so users will continue to use their date of birth as a default 
password to their web-space. 
3. Based on the previously-mentioned points and the required elements to 
successfully conduct a phishing attack in section 3.4.3, we conclude that 
some members of the educational organisation were exposed to internal 
phishing attacks using internal servers. 
3.5 Simulation of phishing attack, awareness measurement and 
educationally based feedback 
3.5.1 Objectives: 
1. Assess the security awareness level of end-users. 
2. Send an effective concise awareness message to avoid prospective 
phishing attacks through a case-study 
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3.5.2 Elements and Method: 
Based on the fact that sending spoof and phishing emails and collecting 
people’s credentials is considered an offence or crime according to most 
countries’ laws (RCMP 2012) (2001). This case-study has been conducted using 
a safe method to achieve the mentioned objectives while protecting the privacy 
of participants. The case-study involves sending people examples of phishing 
emails from known service providers that are familiar to everybody. They are 
then requested to click on a spoof link to direct them to the phishing website. 
Phishing websites are normally designed as a perfect match to the genuine ones 
to deceive users. In order to avoid any errors and omissions by the participants, 
all the “input box” objects are built as dummy objects. In addition, a warning 
message is attached to each page to clarify that this page is a “fake website” to 
show users the similarity between the legitimate and fraudulent websites. At the 
end of the study a survey is conducted to obtain users’ feedback about their 
experience aiming to measure their security awareness.  
The following are the elements of the study: 
a)  Selecting the target group 
Since internet users nowadays include various categories, the selected 
groups are to include students, employees and home users of different ages. 
They will also include females and males with various educational levels such as 
undergraduate, postgraduate and high school studies. It is important to point out 
that students aged between 15 and 20, who are usually unaware of these kinds of 
attacks, have been included in this study since social networks allow this age 
group to setup accounts. Furthermore, most of the famous social networks have 
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become preferred targets of hackers and phishers who use different methods to 
deceive people. Snap Sniper, the website dedicated to making people aware of 
Facebook scams, hoaxes and other internet pitfalls, gives useful information 
about the proper use of Facebook settings. It recently gave a phishing warning 
about a new type of phishing attack where friends posting links to victim’s wall 
urge them to watch a video. In actual fact, it leads them to fake websites.(Sniper 
2012)  
b) Selecting the phishing websites 
We include in this study two famous phishing schemes. Since most of 
the 15-20 age group categories are school students, so that most of them don’t 
have bank accounts to suffer from such phishing problems. Accordingly we 
prefer not to use bank phishing email examples as it will not effectively 
contribute to the research.  
A studied of several common social networks and email service 
providers has taken place. It was important to find high-demand websites that 
are concerned about the privacy of their members. Based on this inspection, a 
decision of selecting Facebook and Microsoft Hotmail is concluded. The first 
one has more than 990 million users (Carlson May 2012) where privacy is 
considered extremely important on social networks. The latter (Microsoft 
Hotmail) is the world's largest web-based email service having more than 324 
million members as per comScore figures available in June 2012 (Rigby July 
2012). Both of the selected websites are subject to daily phishing attacks. 
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c) Invitation to participate in the case study: 
Approximately 240 invitation emails were sent out to different groups of 
friends, employees, colleagues and family members in seven different countries 
asking them to participate in this study. Good responses of 112 were received 
representing 46.6% of invitations. 
d) Defining the problem for the users 
The first page is the welcome statement and encouragement to support 
this study. The following message presenting phishing attacks problem is then 
presented: 
One day, you might receive an email from a company you are familiar 
with, such as (Facebook, Twitter, your bank or hotmail .etc). They invite you to 
visit their website to sort out a certain problem. 
Alternatively, you could receive an email inviting you to make a donation for a 
current disaster appeal.  
The email will most likely be prepared perfectly. It will look like a legitimate 
email. In fact, the email could be sent by hackers in order to hijack your 
credentials or steal your money. The email will encourage you to click on a 
spoofed link to re-direct you to a fake website. 
This kind of scam is called phishing (not fishing). It is one of the most serious 
problems currently facing internet security.  
Briefly, Phishing is “attempting to acquire information (and sometimes, 
indirectly, money) such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details by 
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masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic 
communication. Phishing emails may contain links to websites that are infected 
with malware. Phishing is typically carried out by e-mail spoofing or instant 
messaging, and it often directs users to enter details on a fake website which 
looks and feels identical to the legitimate one”.  
In this study, you will see fake emails and fake websites, then ask you kindly to 
answer some related questions at the end. 
Important note: your credentials will not be saved, only demographic 
information will be collected for study purposes.} End of the message. 
e) The phishing emails and the spoofed websites 
The first example of a phishing email purports to come from Facebook; 
the email urges Facebook users to change their password due to an unusual 
number of invalid login attempts on their account, a common feature of phishing 
emails. This example warns users to take action within 24 hours - otherwise their 
Facebook accounts will be suspended. 
In addition to that, it contains a reassuring statement such as 
“traffic is securely encrypted with a 2048 bits encryption system ensuring that   
your information remains safe”  
Finally, the spoofed link is included. The visible part is 
(https://www.facebook.com) while the actual link is 
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<ahref="http://www.laps.ac.uk/~osasalem/index_eng3.htm">https://www.facebo
ok.com</a>). 
Figure 15 shows the fake Facebook email as an example of a phishing email. 
It is noticeable that this page contains a warning message. 
 
Figure 15: First example of Facebook phishing email 
When the user clicks on the Facebook link, he/she will be directed to the 
phishing website, showing in figure 16: 
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Figure 16: First example of phishing Facebook website 
The phishing Facebook page has a high percentage of similarity with the 
legitimate one. In order to avoid any privacy violation as a result of publishing 
this page, a warning massage has been expressed in red to warn visitors about it. 
In addition, the text box for the email and password doesn’t save any credentials.   
The second example is related to Microsoft Hotmail, and the same 
features have been included on the fake Hotmail page. Figures 17 and 18 show 
the phishing email and the fake Hotmail page. 
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Figure 17: Second example of Hotmail phishing email 
 
Figure 18: Second example of phishing Hotmail website 
It is worth mentioning that 83% of respondents agreed that the fake 
websites in this study are very similar to the legitimate Facebook login page and 
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the hotmail page, some people having filled in both username and password 
before we clearly showing the warming message. 
f) The awareness part of the case-study: 
The second objective of this study is to send an effective, concise 
awareness message to users to attempt implementing the educational part of the 
experiment and to avoid the prospect of phishing attacks. Therefore, the 
following message is used: 
Title: How to protect yourself from phishing 
Based on our studies, we found that phishing attacks are visible problems. It is 
also found that awareness training programme is effective in helping people to 
avoid falling in such traps. Below is some advice that will help you to be better 
safe: 
 Usually, official emails don't include general salutations such as “dear user” or 
“dear customer”. It should contain your name. General salutations mean 
suspicious email. 
 Use the keypad, not the mouse. Type in URLs instead of clicking on links for 
online shopping and banking sites that are typically asking for credit card and 
account numbers. Feeling lazy and clicking on links my take you to an unwanted 
sites resulting unprecedented experiences. 
 Financial organisations or service providers will never ask you for a password or 
private data. It is also important not to email your information since emails are 
not secured. 
 Don't use public computers to login to your private accounts, as they could be 
unprotected and risky i.e. having programmes that can register your information. 
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3.5.3 Survey and feedback of the study: 
Following table 3 shows the Demographics analysis: 
Serial Category Sub Number Total 
1 Age Group 
15 – 20 20 
112 
21 – 25 13 
26 – 30 18 
31 – 35 18 
36 – 40 20 
41 – 45 12 
46 – 50 8 
>50 3 
 
2 Gender 
Female 26 
112 
Male 86 
 
3 Job 
Businessmen 5 
112 
Employees 54 
Not Working 4 
Students 49 
 
4 
Education 
Level 
Diploma 6 
112 
School 22 
High Studies 47 
University 
Graduate 
37 
 
5 Country 
Canada 2 
112 
Jordan 57 
Kuwait 1 
Saudi Arabia 8 
UAE 11 
USA 2 
UK 28 
Other 3 
 Table 3: Demographics analysis of the case study 
All participants were asked four questions in order to measure their 
awareness level and assess their knowledge of phishing attacks. The questions 
and feedback collected are as follows: 
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1. Have you hears about phishing problems before? 
Available answers: 
 It is the first time I hear about it 
 I'm not sure about it 
 Yes I know it very well 
Figure 19 shows the responses to Question 1: 
 
Figure 19: Responses to Question 1 
It is noticeable that this problem is quite well-known nowadays, since 
62% of the people who answered this question are either knew the problem very 
well or were not sure about it. However, this does not mean that this sample of 
end-users is aware of how to protect themselves against attacks. 
 
First time I hear 
about it 
38% 
I'm not sure 
about it 
22% 
yes I know it 
very well 
40% 
Q1: did you hear about phishing 
problem before?  
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2. How much did the spoofed websites that I showed you look like 
legitimate ones? 
Available answers: 
 Slightly different 
 They are not similar 
 They are very similar 
Figure 20, shows the responses to Question 2: 
 
Figure 20: Responses to Question 2 
In this figure, the majority of the participating users believed that the 
fake websites included in this study are similar to the official pages of Facebook 
and Hotmail. It is worth mentioning that one of the users sent us an email 
showing that the Site Safety Centre software from Trend Micro Security systems 
has detected our fake page as a suspicious phishing page. Meanwhile, Norton 
slightly 
different 
15% 
They are not 
similar 
2% 
they are very 
similar 
83% 
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Internet Security 2012 prevented some users from completing the study as the 
visited page is a phishing page. 
3. One of the study objectives is to make you aware about this problem. Do 
you think it was a useful study? 
Available answers 
 No, it wasn't 
 Yes, very useful 
 Yes, it was ok 
Figure 21 shows the responses to Question 3: 
 
Figure 21: Responses to Question 3 
It can be concluded that this study objective has successfully attained as, 
in this question, around 94 of the 112 participants (84%) believed that the 
experiment was very useful while 16 said it was acceptable. Only 2 users have 
found it not useful where they can be security educated ones. 
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4. How do you think the risk of this problem (phishing) can be reduced? 
Available answers 
 Anti-phishing tools and security software 
 By training and awareness programs 
 Both of them 
Figure 22 shows the responses to Question 4: 
 
Figure 22: responds to Question 4 
The majority of the respondents (87%) believed that this problem can be 
reduced by installing anti-phishing tools which are already built into most 
security software and awareness programs. 
The final section of this study asked the participants to send their 
feedback about the study and their experience related to phishing problems. The 
following are some of pinions expressed at the end of the survey. 
5% 
8% 
87% 
Q4: Recommended Solutions by 
Participants 
Anti-phishing tools and
security software
By Training and awarness
programs
Both of them
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- “I know this problem from some messages which I received from my 
bank highlighting this problem; there was some software distributed by 
this bank to help avoid phishing websites. The software is called 
Trusteer”. 
- “Many forums and websites help people to create phishing websites; you 
don't have to be a hacker in order to defraud people.” 
- “My Facebook account has been stolen, then I managed to recover it 
through my email; it’s better to use different passwords for different 
accounts.” 
- “I heard about this problem before, but I didn’t know that hackers could 
create the same pages of the social networks that make people trust it. 
Usually I don’t open any suspicious emails except in some cases like 
sending email for specific destinations.” 
“Phishing could be accurately described as unauthorised activity during 
which an intruder and unscrupulous computer user tricks individuals into 
divulging privilege information and bank and credit card numbers” 
- “I had friends who received spoofed PayPal emails from people who 
wanted to buy their items. So the person receives fake email from 
"PayPal" telling them that money has been put into their account and the 
person who is uneducated about this topic does not log into the real 
PayPal to check - he sends out the item and is scammed”. 
- “I have read about this problem in different media and newsletters, but I 
never expected that they could build fake pages with high similarity.” 
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- In addition to that, many of the contributors expressed their gratitude and 
compliments to the organisers as it was a useful study since it made them 
aware of this serious problem. It’s important to indicate that, for more 
than 38% of the participants, this was the first time they had realised this 
problem existed.  
3.6 Findings 
The first case-study shows that neglecting security policies 
implementation has exposed the bank to a severe problem. The investigations 
revealed that 94% of the users were selecting easy passwords such as “123” this 
allowed the virus to infect the systems in few hours and halted the bank’s 
services. On the other hand, in the second case-study we found that the 
organisation forces users to select a password with a certain length and a mixture 
of small and capital characters with numbers. However, it is found that people 
could select repeated characters such as “Aaaaaaa1” that can be easily captured 
by shoulder surfing attack. Therefore, the password policy should take into 
consideration all kinds of password attacks such as brute-forcing, dictionary-
based and shoulder surfing attacks. In the third case-study we found that 
slackness in implementing a basic security policy could leave the organisation 
vulnerable to an internal phishing attack, since the users were given a default 
“Date of Birth” password which they were not forced to change at first login. In 
addition to that, granting people web-spaces in the organisation’s servers under 
(considering weak policies are in place) subjected the organisation to internal 
phishing attacks that have managed used the official domain of the enterprise.  
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The final survey indicates that phishing emails are still a serious threat 
for internet users. Anti-phishing tools are not enough to reduce the risk of this 
problem. Training and awareness programs are playing a role in protecting the 
privacy of the internet environment. 
In order to increase the performance of security systems to reduce the 
impact of social engineering attacks such as shoulder surfing and phishing, it is 
important to integrate security policies, anti-phishing solutions and awareness 
programs into a homogeneous security scheme augmented by a continuous 
security audit process on a regular basis to address and ensure the smooth flow 
of the working systems. 
Based on the above studies, it is obvious that polices should be written, 
implemented and observed through a regular audit process. The mere existence 
of a security policy doesn’t mean that the risk of attacks is reduced. 
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4 Password Strength 
4.1 Introduction 
Many computer users are managing their accounts and stock portfolios, 
accessing e-services and taking measures to protect their systems and documents every 
day. Authentication is the most common method used in these measures, where the user 
is using system passwords or document protection (Schneier 2004; Xiaoyuan, Ying et 
al. 2005). 
A report from Cambridge University Computer Laboratory states that one the 
most famous vulnerabilities nowadays is using weak and insecure passwords (Bonneau 
2012), hence selecting strong passwords is very important factor of protecting our 
privacy. Many computer users do not have enough security knowledge to be able to 
select strong passwords; hence they should use a measurement tool to gauge the 
strength of their passwords. Many users create their own rules for password selection 
which may lead to the selection of weak passwords (Adams and Sasse 1999). 
The term ‘strong password’ is vague. Users and people in general are normally not 
aware how passwords are cracked (Adams and Sasse 1999), since some long passwords 
can be cracked in seconds (Dieterle 2010). Hackers use many techniques to gain access 
to or crack weak passwords; one of the most famous techniques is a brute-force attack 
which depends on testing all the possibilities. The new computer processing power 
helps to perform millions of trials in a few minutes (Technology 2006). A dictionary 
attack is widely used by password crackers to break into protected documents since 
most computer users are using common passwords or names for password protection 
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(Kenneth Allendoerfer 2005). The shoulder surfing attack is a third technique being 
used. It often takes place in crowded areas such as internet cafes, airports and computer 
labs, users are responsible to defends against this kind of attacks (Wiedenbeck, Waters 
et al. 2006). Therefore, to prevent the three aforementioned techniques (brute-force, 
dictionary and shoulder surfing attacks) security experts agree that strong passwords 
should not be based on dictionary words, should have sufficient entropy (Gehringer 
2002), and should be fully random. 
Many researchers and vendors have developed different methodologies and tools 
to measure the strength of passwords. These include Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, etc. 
Bergadano and co-authors  (Bergadano, Crispo et al. 1997 ) used a decision tree to 
classify a password as “good” or “bad”. The experiment was performed on passwords of 
8 characters in length and very highly compressed dictionaries. The aim of the research 
was to find passwords that are partially based on the dictionary or meaningful words 
with some modification. Meanwhile Duffy and Jagota (Nigel and Arun 2002) presented 
a connectionist algorithm to test the quality of passwords by examining a given 
password against a large dictionary of words and near-words. They used a compact 
dictionary stored in the network in distributed form to achieve a high performance in 
testing passwords. 
Jeff Yan used entropy to measure the strength of passwords; his method 
conducted on 7 characters length of passwords and depended on exploiting effective 
patterns to prevent low-entropy passwords (Jianxin Jeff 2001). Length and complexity 
are important factors in strengthening passwords (Scarfone and Souppaya 2009). 
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4.2 Factors affecting password strength 
Literature shows that there are three Critical Factors affecting password strength. 
These are: 
4.2.1 Shoulder surfing (password length) 
Length of a password is an important factor, people should aware about 
it, since it is their responsibly to protect themselves against such attacks 
(Wiedenbeck, Waters et al. 2006). Human ability is capable to memorise words 
consisting of (7±2) characters (Miller 1956), length is not enough to secure 
passwords in some circumstances as a 14 characters password could be cracked 
in seconds (Dieterle 2010).  
4.2.2 Dictionary based 
 This kind of attacks is based on using huge dictionaries, it is success at 
offline systems usually (Schneier 2004) and with easy to remember passwords 
that people are used to choose (Lin  Chun-Li, Sun  Hung-Min et al. 2001). So it 
is important to select strong password that is not based on dictionary.  
4.2.3 Password entropy (Character sets) 
Password entropy is related to complexity of the password length and 
character sets used, so in order to double the number of guesses required 
cracking the password, adding one bit of entropy to the password will make the 
attacker's task twice as difficult. (William E. Burr, Donna F. Dodson et al. 2006) 
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Since the entropy estimates the time required of crack, passwords with 
low entropy are considered weak (Jianxin Jeff 2001). The entropy of a given 
password can be increased by increasing the size of the password and the variety 
of different character sets used.  
4.3 Existing Tools and Approaches 
Several online measurement tools are provided for internet users to test 
their passwords. Google, Yahoo and Facebook for example have a password 
strength meter integrated with the registration form which can be utilised when 
creating a new account or changing a password. 
Microsoft, (the global software leader) CertainKey Cryptosystems, 
Google, Yahoo, and Facebook have qualitative online measurement tools. The 
following are the main characteristics of these tools: 
4.3.1 Microsoft  
Microsoft has developed a free web-based tool to measure the strength of 
passwords (Microsoft 2006) with an update in 2011 (Microsoft 2011). Passwords 
are divided into four categories: “Weak”, “Medium”, “Strong”, and “Best”. 
Following the testing of many passwords, it appears that Microsoft does not 
consider shoulder surfing attacks in their assessment of passwords. Table 4 
shows two different passwords that were tested on a Microsoft platform in May 
2006 and June 2011. 
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Password Length Entropy Memorable 
Rate 
2006 
Rate 
2011 
Bbbbbbb1 8 ~48 bits Easy Strong Weak 
eoqpwsjfhvdlfkep 16 ~75 bits Hard Weak Strong 
aaaaaa1234567 13 ~67 bits Easy - Strong 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaa 14 ~66 bits So Easy Weak Strong 
Table 4: Passwords tested by Microsoft password checker 
Basically, the first password complies with the rules of having small and 
capital letters and one numerical digit, but it does not have sufficient 
randomness and just two keys of the keyboard are used, one of them used twice 
as small and capital letters.  
According to Miller’s findings, this type of password can easily be 
memorised and captured by any shoulder surfing attacker at first glance. We 
agree that this password is easy to remember, however, the second one is not 
because it is fully randomised and needs a long time to crack. Additionally, the 
second password is hard to capture by a shoulder surfing attacker (it needs 
around 26
16
 probabilities ~ 75bits, making it much stronger than the first one 
which needs 62
8
 probabilities ~ 48 bits). The third and fourth passwords are long 
but they are easy to memorise and can be captured easily by shoulder surfing 
attacks. 
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It is worth mentioning that Microsoft has updated its password strength 
measurement technique. We noticed that the ratings for the first two passwords 
in table 4 have been changed from weak to strong, and from strong to weak, 
respectively i.e. moving in the right direction. meanwhile the last two passwords 
in the previous table show that shoulder surfing attacks have not been 
considered, as these passwords “aaaaaa1234567” and 
“aaaaaaaaaaaaaa” can be captured easily by curious people in spite of the 
fact that they have high entropy rates.  
4.3.2 CertainKey Cryptosystems 
This is a security company specialising in security and cryptosystems to 
secure small and medium-sized business networks. The ‘Pass-phrase Strength 
Analyser’ is a commercial product for testing the strength of passwords; one can 
test it online before purchasing (CertainKey 2006). The result of testing a 
password is based on the number of days needed to crack the password or pass-
phrase. The password will pass the test if it takes more than approximately 300 
days to crack. Otherwise, the result will be 0 days to crack, showing a red cross 
(conducted on 21
st
 Jun 2010). 
By using a dictionary, calculating the entropy of the password 
“zxcvbnm111” and using a mixture of character sets (consisting of small 
characters and numbers); it will take around 27888 days to crack this password. 
The reader may notice that this word is easy to remember as it consists of the last 
line on the keyboard with a repeated number, so from a shoulder surfing point of 
view this word is not secure enough. 
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On the other hand the password “EDkfeux$£dkwo12boy” (which is 
18 characters long) failed the test because it is partially based on the dictionary 
word “boy” as shown in figure 23. Actually the first 15 characters of that 
password are fully random with high entropy. By testing this portion of this 
password we get a very strong password that will require millions of days to 
crack, i.e. adding a small meaningful word to a complicated phrase shouldn’t 
affect the strength of the password. 
 
Figure 23: CertainKey password checker fail to rate strong password 
4.3.3 Google: 
By visiting the Google website to open an email account or change the 
password, a strength meter, integrated with the registration form, appears beside 
the password textbox. Passwords on the Google website are rated as “Weak”, 
“Fair”, “Good”, and “Strong”. By testing many passwords on the 22nd Jun 2009, 
it was noticed that, according to our definition, very weak passwords were rated 
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as strong. This can be demonstrated by using the password “zxcv1111”. This is 
rated as a strong password as in figure 24, though it is memorable and has a 
keyboard sequence with a repeated number! 
 
Figure 24: password checker from Google 
By performing the same test on the Google website in June 2011, we 
noticed that passwords of 8 characters, such as “zxcv1111”, were rated as 
“Good” while adding one digit at the end makes it a strong password such as 
“zxcv11111” which was considered “Strong”. 
4.3.4 Yahoo: 
This is one of the largest internet service providers in the world and has a 
similar technique for rating a given password. When the user attempts to create 
an account, an integrated password checker helps to gauge the strength of the 
new password.  
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Four green boxes appear beside the password’s textbox to indicate the 
strength of the given password. The final rate is divided into 4 levels; one red 
box means too short (as in figure 25), two yellow boxes means weak, three green 
boxes means strong while a very strong password is indicated by four green 
boxes. 
 
Figure 25: password checker from Yahoo shows a strong password as weak password 
By testing many passwords, it can be noticed that the password strength 
measuring tool doesn’t work properly. Following are some passwords tested in 
June 2009 
Password Length Entropy Memorable Rate 
aaa111 6 ~31 bits Easy Strong (3 
green boxes)  
eRxq1pwQsjfNhvd$ffff 20 ~112 bits Hard Too short (1 
red box) 
Table 5: Passwords tested by Yahoo password checker 
We noticed that the first password can be easily cracked, since it is 6 
characters long, has low entropy and is easy to memorise. This password was 
rated as strong in June 2009 by Yahoo’s password checker. On the other hand, 
the second one is more complicated; it is 20 characters long, has high entropy 
and is hard to catch via shoulder surfing attacks. The last 4 digits of the password 
are repeated, but that should not affect the whole password, since the first 16 
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characters are strong. According to the new rating system supplied by Yahoo, the 
second password was rated as Very Strong. 
4.3.5 Facebook: 
Finally, we tested Facebook’s password checker. Facebook is one of the 
largest e-society websites worldwide, where privacy is important. A password 
meter as shown in figures 26 helps the user to measure the strength of the 
selected password. 
 
Figure 26: Facebook Password checker shows strong password 
A password such as “A1111111” was rated as strong, although it can be 
easily captured by a shoulder surfing attack.  Meanwhile, a password such as 
“eoqpwasjfhbvdclfkepx” was rated as weak, although it consists of 20 
characters, is fully random (~94 bits Entropy) and is hard to capture by a 
shoulder surfing attack. Clearly, this checker failed to measure the strength 
against shoulder surfing attacks.  
In this chapter we present an investigation into the evaluation of 
password strength by using a new tool to measure the strength of passwords 
using Fuzzy rules. The new tool is designed using artificial intelligence to 
measure password strength against any dictionary, brute-force and shoulder 
CHAPTER FOUR 
86 
surfing attacks. Finally, comparative performances of the proposed tool and 
existing tools are presented and discussed to demonstrate its merits and 
capabilities. 
4.4 Proposed Methodology 
The proposed methodology was built using the fuzzy logic rule base. 
Fuzzy logic is used widely in network security and risk assessment to measure 
the exact value of security status. It was conceived as a better method for 
handling data since it mimics human control logic. It uses an imprecise but very 
descriptive (more like a human operator) language to deal with input data. It is 
very robust and forgiving of operator and data input and often works when first 
implemented with little or no tuning.(Luo, Bridges et al. 2001; Shi, Li et al. 
2004; Dong-Mei, Jing-Hong et al. 2005). 
To build a strong measurement algorithm using Fuzzy sets to prevent 
dictionary, brute-force and shoulder surfing (social engineering) attacks, three 
factors are considered: 
Password length is the first factor taken into consideration; the password 
is supposed to be long enough to avoid brute-force attacks and confound human 
memory. Recent experiments performed by Lockdown Security Centre (Center 
2006) show that a password of 6 characters can be instantly cracked regardless 
of the entropy of that password, while cracking those of 7 or 8 characters in 
length is dependent on the entropy of the passwords and the machine used to 
crack it. 
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Back to Miller’s research (Miller 1956) on human mind capability, who 
stated that a person can remember 7±2 symbols from a given string of random 
characters. Therefore, to prevent single-glance shoulder surfing we might 
consider a 10-character-length password as the start of a strong password, 
depending on the other factors. 
The second factor is dictionary-based passwords. Many researchers agree 
that passwords should not be based on a dictionary (Gehringer 2002; Xiaoyuan, 
Ying et al. 2005), simply because the hackers are using huge dictionaries that 
consist of thousands of words, names, brands, movie names and common 
passwords to crack protected documents and websites. In some cases the 
password could be partially based on a dictionary (as in the 16 characters 
password “Edkfeux$dkwo1boy” which CertainKey tool regarded as weak 
because it contains the word “boy” that represents no more than 20% of the total 
word length while the other 80% is very complicated phrase and so hard to be 
glanced or hacked). In this case we may accept the password to be partially 
based on dictionary as long as the other portion is enjoying adequate strength. 
Accordingly, the keyboard patterns are to be considered in the measurement. 
A Visual Basic algorithm is deployed to consider all the sequences and 
patterns of keyboard keys, alphabetic and numerals, to avoid creating easy 
passwords that are vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks.  
Entropy of the password is the third factor and a very important one. The 
entropy estimates the time required to crack the password. Passwords with low 
entropy are considered weak (Jianxin Jeff 2001). The entropy of a given 
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password can be increased by increasing the size of the password and the variety 
of different character sets used. 
To calculate the Rate (R) of a language containing L characters, we use 
the Log base 2 algorithm (Schneier 1996): 
R = Log2 L                      (1) 
On the other hand, the Entropy of a character set can be calculated by 
using Shannon’s estimation (Shannon 1951): 
 
       (2)  
Where x   Character set 
The two formulae (1) and (2) will produce the same result, The following table 
shows the character set’s components, and the size of each character set: 
Character Set used Character Set  Size 
Numbers 10 
Capital or  Small Letters 26 
Special Characters 33 
Numbers & Small Letters 36 
Small Letters & Special Characters 59 
Small Letters, Capital Letters & Special Characters 85 
Using all Character Sets 95 
Table 6: Length of different character sets 
 
))((log)( 12
 xPxPH
CHAPTER FOUR 
89 
 
Figure 27: Entropy of different character sets 
It is noticed that the entropy can be increased by using a mixture of 
different character sets.  
The Entropy PWE of a fully random password of length L can be 
calculated as follows: 
                PWE = H * L  (3) 
For a given password of 10 characters and mix of numbers and small 
letters, the key space of the password (according to table 6) will be 36 
characters. Therefore, the maximum entropy will be log (36) / log(2) ~ 5.16 bits 
per symbol and the entropy of the password according to equation (3) will be 
5.16 * 10 = 51.6 bits. 
For English words, Shannon estimated the rate of entropy (R) as 2.3 bits 
per symbol, while Bruce Schneier in (Schneier 1996) estimated it as 1.3 bits per 
symbol based on Thomas Cover’s studies. Thus we are using the latest 
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estimation technique of Schneier to calculate the Entropy of meaningful 
passwords which is 1.3 bits per symbol. 
In case of passwords that have English words and random text, according 
to equation (2) (which shows that the entropy is a summation of the probabilities 
of each character) we consider the total entropy to be equivalent to the 
summation of the entropy of each part.  
    PWE = H * L(Random part) + R * L(English word part)          (4) 
4.5 Combined Model 
The three factors (Length, Dictionary-based and Entropy) are combined 
into one model through a fuzzy process in order to obtain the rating of the 
password with each given factor represented as a membership function on three 
different levels. As a rule, fuzzy systems have been built to provide the rating of 
a given password; detailed membership function is shown in section 4.7. The 
following figure demonstrates the fuzzy process 
 
Figure 28: The Fuzzy Process 
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4.6 Quantitative Approach 
Based on the quantitative values given to the password strength factors, it is 
possible to quantify the measurement and make it easy for the interested users to 
measure the strength of their passwords to help them make a decision. 
 The reader may have noticed that all addressed tools are indicating the 
strength as Weak, Medium, Passed and Strong. The proposed tool is designed to show 
the results as a percentage of a strong password using the three known measures 
simultaneously. Knowing that 50% of password strength does not reflect a weak 
password, organisations may choose the present at which a password is accepted to 
them. 
4.7 Experiments and Results 
The three factors mentioned above are weighted carefully to produce a strong 
password that can resist dictionary, brute-force and shoulder surfing attacks. Each input 
has three-membership functions of a Fuzzy scheme.  
4.7.1 Length:  
Length of a password is an important factor, due to the human ability to 
memorise words consisting of (7±2) characters (Miller 1956). Any given 
password is considered short when it’s 7 characters or less, while a complicated 
10 characters password is considered Long since it will take a long time to be 
cracked using a brute force attack. Finally, password length of 7 to 12 characters 
are considered medium based on other factors.  
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Three membership functions (Short-Medium-Long) of length factor are 
shown in table 7:  
Length of 
password 
Membership 
0 - 7 Short 
7 - 12 Medium 
10 – 14 Long 
Table 7: Membership of password length 
 
Figure 29: Membership Function of Password Length in MATLAB 
4.7.2 Dictionary based 
The importance of this factor is to avoid dictionary attack; if a dictionary 
word forms more than 60% of the length of a password, the password is 
considered “fully based”, while those with more than 30% and less than 80% are 
considered “partially based”. If more than 70% of the password is not based on 
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a dictionary word it is considered “not based”. The following password table 8 
shows the three memberships of the dictionary-based factor.  
Dictionary Based Membership 
More than 60%  based 
on dictionary  
Fully Based 
30% to 80% consists in 
dictinoary  
Partially  
More than 70% not 
based on dictionary  
Not Based  
Table 8: Membership of dictionary based 
 
 
Figure 30: Membership Function of Dictionary-based in MATLAB 
Additionally, a combination of a developed algorithm and a huge English 
dictionary can be used to find any hidden word in a password within 
milliseconds. 
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4.7.3 Entropy  
Based on the time needed to crack a given password, the entropy 
membership is categorised as Low, Medium and High. 
The following table 9 shows the entropy per symbol for all character sets 
(Schneier 1996). 
 
Character Set used Character 
Set  Size 
Entropy per 
symbol  
Total 
Entropy 
of 8 
characters 
password 
Numbers 10 3.3 bits 26.4 bits 
Capital or  Small Letters 26 4.7 bits 37.6 bits 
Special characters 33 5 bits 40 bits 
Numbers & Small Letters 36 5.17 bits 41.36 
Small letters & Special 
Characters 
59 5.88 bits 47.04 bits 
Small letters, Capital Letters 
& Special Characters 
85 6.4 bits 51.2 bits 
Using all character sets 95 6.57 bits 52.56 bits 
Table 9: Character set and Entropy of 8 character password 
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Since the entropy of a given password is based on the character set used 
(Table 9) and length of the password,  
MS Access with Visual Basic was used to analyse the password before 
using these parameters as the input to fuzzy sets. The dictionary
1
used consists of 
more than 800,000 words, in addition a Visual Basic algorithm was used to 
generate all the horizontal and vertical sequences of the keyboard, alphabetic 
characters and numbers to avoid using easy patterns that can be memorised by a 
shoulder surfing attacker. Finally the entropy was calculated according to 
equation (3).  
The output of the tool is shown below: 
For the password “AdSrGhcgFTrzdG”: 
 Length = 14 characters 
 Dictionary Based = 1 (means doesn’t base on dictionary at all)  
                                                 
 
1
 The dictionary can be downloaded from 
http://sunsite.mff.cuni.cz/MIRRORS/ftp.funet.fi/pub/unix/security/passwd/crack/dictionaries/american/di
c-0294.tar.gz 
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 Entropy = L * H (based on equation 3) 
 = 14 * 5.7 
Total entropy  = 79.81 
So, the input of this password will be  14,1,79.81 
The following table shows the results of keyboard and alphabet pattern passwords. 
Ser Password Microsoft 
a
 CertainKey
a
 Google 
a 
 Yahoo Facebook PTool
a
 
1 Abcdefghij Medium Passed Strong Strong Medium Weak 
2 Asdfghjkl Medium Passed Strong Strong Medium Weak 
3 Poiuytrew Medium Passed Strong Strong Medium Weak 
4 098765432 Weak Failed Strong Weak Medium Weak 
5 Qwertasdfgh Medium Passed Strong Strong Medium Weak 
6 Asdfghj123456 Strong Passed Strong V. Strong Strong Weak 
7 Zxcvbnm111 Strong Passed Strong V. Strong Strong Weak 
(a) The tests were conducted in June 2010. 
Table 10: Passwords of keyboard patterns (Ptool represents the proposed tool) 
The keyboard-pattern passwords are usually easy to memorise by the 
shoulder surfing attacker because they are dependent on the hand motion and the 
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locations of the keys on the keyboard. The first password in table 6 is an 
alphabetic sequence that makes it easy to track even if the first character is a 
capital letter. The second one is a sequence of the second line of the keyboard, 
while the third one is the first line from right to left. Noticeably, the fourth 
password is a numeric sequence which was failed in Microsoft and CertainKey 
and passed in a Google test. The next one is a sequence from the first and second 
lines on the keyboard. The last two passwords are two concatenated keyboard 
sequences. 
A set of passwords that are based on a dictionary are tested and 
compared to PTool with the following table showing the results of passwords 
based completely and partially on a dictionary: 
Ser Password Microsoft 
a
 CertainKey
a
 Google 
a
 Yahoo
 a
 Facebook
 a
 PTool
a
 
1 Simulation Medium Failed Strong Strong Medium Weak 
2 
Communication
1 
Best Failed Strong Very strong Strong Weak 
3 Kids2000 Strong Failed Strong Very strong Strong Weak 
4 Dell1234 Strong Failed Strong Very strong Strong Weak 
5 smile1%r&y*7 Strong Failed Strong Very strong Strong Medium 
6 
Ab$z2y3%u3Dr
5boy 
Best Failed Strong Very strong Strong Strong 
CHAPTER FOUR 
98 
7 
K$es&kpw$312
bye 
Best Failed Strong Very strong Strong Strong 
(a) The tests were conducted in June 2009. 
Table 11: Results of passwords based on dictionary 
The first word in table 11 is based fully on a dictionary; it failed in 
CertainKey, was rated as medium on Microsoft’s website and was strong on 
Google. Since hackers use huge dictionaries to crack protected documents and 
websites, this password should be rated as weak. 93% of the second password is 
an English word and thus makes it easy for a shoulder surfer to predict or spy; 
this password should also be rated as weak. The third, fourth and fifth passwords 
are based partially on a dictionary, but the rest of the third one does not include 
sufficient randomness when compared to the fifth one which is rated medium 
while the third one is weak. The last two are 16 characters long with less than 
20% of them based on a dictionary. The first portions of these passwords are 
very strong with high entropy so they are not easy to crack. At the same time, 
they are not memorable so adding a small English word would not affect their 
strength substantially. 
Table 12 shows passwords with high entropy but which were failed by 
Microsoft’s password checker 
Ser Password 
Entropy 
(Bits) 
Microsoft PTool 
1 pwfmnaozryqmd 61.11 Weak  Strong 
2 *$"!£%(+&^) \&%  70.62 Weak Strong 
3 owiehjt5814709 72.38 Medium Strong 
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4 SKDITRNELWERFTGX 75.21 Weak Strong 
5 AdSrGhcgFTrzdY 79.81 Medium Strong 
6 K1G4T6Y7I5O4P3X3V 87.89 Medium Strong 
7 p*(g)rz^q#a~rx-ufve$ 117.65 Medium Strong 
Table 12: Results of high entropy passwords 
All the passwords in table 12 are fully random with high entropy, not 
based on a dictionary and long enough to resist shoulder surfing attacks. The 
first password - which has the lowest entropy of the group - needs 26
13
 (~ 2.48 
quintillion probabilities) to crack it. This means that if we are using a dual 
processor computer that can perform 10
6
 trials per/second, we need 7867 years 
to crack the password. Such a password should not be considered weak. The last 
one consists of 20 characters with 117.65 bits/symbol of entropy. It needs 59
20
 
(~ 2.61
35 
probabilities) to crack it resulting in the need for millions of years of 
processing time. Accordingly, this password should be rated ‘Best’ not 
‘Medium’ as stated by Microsoft’s ranking system 
Table 13 shows passwords with low entropy or sequences but 
nevertheless passed by the Google password checker: 
Ser Password 
Entropy 
Or Seq. 
Google PTool 
1 maryblige 13.00 Strong Weak 
2 56128911 26.58 Strong Weak 
3 zxcvbasd Sequence Strong Weak 
4 oiuytrewq Sequence Good Weak 
5 asdf1111 Sequence Strong  Weak 
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6 zxczxczxczxc 
Repeated 
Sequence 
Good  Weak 
7 aaasssdddfff 
Repeated 
Sequence 
Strong  Weak 
Table 13: Results of low entropy or sequence passwords 
Noticeably, the first password is a name and is rated as strong by Google. 
Bruce Schneier estimates the entropy of this password as 1.3 * 11 (~ 13 
bits/symbol). The second password is a number with low entropy and is easy to 
memorise. The third is a simple password and is also easy to memorise, while 
the next is a keyboard pattern – part of the first line of the keyboard. The fifth 
one is a sequence with repeated numbers; the last two passwords are repeated 
and keyboard patterns; hence, from a shoulder surfing point of view, they can be 
captured easily. All are rated as Fair, Good and Strong by Google even though 
they are clearly weak. 
The last table shows different passwords with a little difference to 
presents how quantitative approach is applied 
Ser Password Strength Rate 
1 1234567890 17.47 Weak 
2 8463129507 21.64 Weak 
Table 14: Quantitative approach 
The two passwords are weak indeed since both are numeric, short and 
easy to memorise. We noted that the second password a bit complicated 
comparing to the first one, which is sequence of numbers; therefore it is 
approximately stronger by 4%.  
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It worth mention that selecting above passwords based on the weakness 
of the existing tools, following table shows the weakness point of each 
mentioned tool: 
Company Weakness point Example 
Microsoft Not consider repeated 
character as weak password 
Aaaaaaaaa1 is strong 
password 
CertainKey Adding a dictionary word to 
sufficient strong password 
weakens the strength of the 
password. 
D4#d3ss35fsw5Boy 
considered as weak 
password. 
Google Keyboard sequence passwords 
can be rated as strong 
zxcv1111 is strong 
password. 
Yahoo Short password consist of 6 
repeated letters can be rated as 
strong. 
aaa11 is strong 
password. 
Facebook Use long variant and 
complicated letters from same 
character set with high entropy 
considered as weal 
orfnmdjetirdldkswmeodi 
considered as weak 
password. 
Table 15: Table of existing tools weaknesses 
It is worth mentioning that comparing the proposed Ptool to the existing 
password tools is a challenging task since it was done while considering many fronts 
that are not open to users or available for analysis such as algorithms, models and 
business rules. In addition, the venders of these tools do not release the mechanism used 
to rate a password. What was available is no more than guidance that is found at their 
websites. Accordingly, several password patterns were assessed to find out any 
weakness of the used tools. 
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4.8 Proactive Proposed Tool 
The password policy settings in a group policy may not guarantee good 
passwords because they are not very flexible (Johansson 2004). As far as we know, 
policies are implemented to protect the information against strangers, the curious and 
attackers (Charles Cresson Wood and Lineman 2009).  Other researchers suggested that 
policies should be enforced (Michael E. Whitman 2010) since it is easy to write and 
improve an effective information security policy but it is extremely difficult to assure 
the implementation thereof.  The PTool can be used as a proactive measuring tool to 
prevent users selecting weak passwords as it forces them to select strong passwords. In 
addition to that (and to achieve a maximum level of security during the process of 
changing the password) an API function such as “SecureZeroMemory” and 
“NetUserChangePassword” should be deployed at the outset to assess password 
security and to limit the effect of spyware and hacking scripts. 
Following figure 31, shows the complete simulation form and testing the 
password “abcd1234”, it is shows the final WEAK password message in red box, the 
module has instructions for the user to select strong password, in addition a warning 
message beside each feature of the password, at the end of windows the rate of the 
password in quantity form is appear, which is 20.23 in this case: 
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Figure 31: Password checker for password “abcd1234”(PTool) 
Following figure 32, shows the complete simulation form and testing the password 
“fsdf334dsr£$df”, it is shows the final strong password message in green box, the 
awareness messages are clear, the long is sufficient, the password not based on 
dictionary and not easy to memorise due to the long and variety of character set uses the 
password has a re of 78.74 of strength, figure 33 shows a medium rate password. 
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Figure 32: Password checker for password “fsdf334dsr£$df” (PTool) 
 
Figure 33: Password checker for password "4524556547673" 
4.9 Conclusion 
Password strength is important in protecting personal and important information. 
It is found that password strength can be gagged based on three factors; length, 
dictionary based words and entropy. It is also noticed that no one has used the approach 
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of combining the three factors together in order to accurately assess the password 
strength. 
In this chapter, an intelligent tool (PTool) has been proposed to measure the 
strength of passwords using Fuzzy rule sets that may help to prevent dictionary, brute-
force and shoulder surfing attacks simultaneously. Large dictionaries (consisting of 
800,000 English words, common passwords and keyboard patterns) are used to 
demonstrate the impact of the proposed and existing tools. Lists of passwords were 
analysed to explore the words that are partially based on a dictionary. Entropy is 
considered as the tool providing the main factor of password strength to resist brute-
force attacks. The devolved tool (PTool) demonstrated through a set of experiments that 
the length of a password should be longer than 8 characters to resist shoulder surfing 
attacks. The performance of the proposed tool has been compared with major providers 
around the world in order to demonstrate its merits and capabilities. 
In addition, the password strength can offer quantitative values rather than 
qualitative description as used by all vendors. This approach quantifies the 
measurement and makes it easy for the interested parties to measure the strength of 
their passwords helping to make better informed decision. 
Finally, the awareness messages can provide guidance and explains the reasons 
behind password rate value helping the user to better appreciate password strength. 
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5 Phishing Emails Capture Module 
5.1 Introduction 
Millions of electronic financial transactions are executed globally every day 
through the Internet. Banks, shops and governments offer online account access and 
online payments (Larcom and Elbirt 2006). Personal information such as usernames, 
passwords, credit card numbers and account numbers are the core of online transactions.  
Hackers and curious people are always seeking new methods to breach privacy 
through vulnerabilities that exist in the World Wide Web’s backbone systems. Securing 
millions of online transactions is becoming more sophisticated as numerous methods are 
invented daily to breach privacy. Phishing is one of the methods that deceive people 
into revealing their personal information (i.e. username, password, bank account and 
credit card number) by using social engineering and technical tools in place of the 
traditional methods such as sniffing, Trojan horses or viruses. 
What is phishing? 
The anti-phishing work group (APWG)
2
 defined phishing as “an attack that uses 
both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers' personal identity 
                                                 
 
2
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is the global pan-industrial and law enforcement association focused on 
eliminating the fraud and identity theft that result from phishing, pharming and email spoofing of all types. 
http://www.antiphishing.org/ 
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data and financial account credentials. Social-engineering schemes use 'spoofed' e-mails 
to lead consumers to counterfeit websites designed to trick them into divulging financial 
data”. 
Phishing attacks cost companies and consumers thousands to millions of dollars 
every year. In addition, the e-business sector loses clients’ confidence, which is worth 
millions. According to APWG’s phishing report in February 2007, the number of email 
phishing attacks increased by around 37% in the period between Feb. ‘06 and Feb. ’07. 
Meanwhile, the unique phishing websites detected by APWG increased by 80% in the 
same period (Wenyin, Xiaotie et al. 2006; APWG 2007). Phishing has become a 
criminal act, categorised as one of the most effective online scams (Brooks 2006). 
How does phishing work? 
The phishing process usually starts with a spoofed email influencing people to 
login to their accounts by using forged web pages that look like the official web page of 
the legitimate service provider, such as a bank or an e-shop (Engin and Christopher 
2005). The spoofed emails often look like valid emails because the phishers use the 
same logos and graphic pictures as the original website (Microsoft 2006). In addition, 
the scam emails contain deceptive URL addresses linking to a scam website. 
Figure 34 shows a scam email that shares the graphics of eBay website and a 
deceptive URL linking to a fake website (Microsoft 2006). 
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Figure 34 : Scam email shares graphics with legitimate website 
By clicking on the link, the user will be directed to a false website that looks like 
the legitimate one. The information is captured as soon as the victim enters the 
username, password or credit card number. Therefore, users should not forward 
unauthenticated emails, click on unusual links in an email or use search engines to look 
for online donations and charitable organisations (Tzer-Shyong, Fuh-Gwo et al. 2006). 
Phishing may be conducted directly and telephonically to obtain a victim’s 
personal information. Some phishers pose as employers and call people who have listed 
themselves on job search websites asking them about their social security number or 
sensitive information. Another scenario is when someone calls the victim asking 
him/her to reconfirm the financial information such as the credit card number because 
of an overdue bill (Charles E. Frank and Werner 2007). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
109 
5.2 Phishing techniques 
The following are five major techniques used to accomplish phishing attacks: 
5.2.1 Impersonation 
This is a common technique. Simply, the phishing email falsely claims to 
be from a legitimate business where the victims might have an account. The 
phisher uses the same logos and graphics as the original website so that the scam 
email appears to be an official email asking the user to log in to solve certain 
problems (Yue Zhang 2007). This type of attack weakens consumer confidence 
as it makes it difficult for the average user to distinguish between legitimate and 
fraudulent emails.  
5.2.2 Forward attack 
This is a sophisticated technique where the phisher collects personal 
information through a scam email that includes harmful code or script. By using 
an effective anti-virus, this phishing technique becomes ineffective since the 
anti-virus picks up the code that collects the victim’s information (James 2006). 
Figure 35 shows an email containing two text boxes to allow the victim to enter 
their SSN and the PIN code. After typing the information, the code behind the 
email transfers the user to the legitimate website after collecting the credentials. 
5.2.3 Pop-up attack 
This technique launches a hostile pop-up in front of the legitimate 
website asking the victim to login through a secured pop-up window. Once the 
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user logs in to the pop-up, the phisher captures the victim’s credentials and 
forwards him/her to the official website (James 2006). In this case, the pop-up 
window works as a ‘middleman’ to collect the information. 
5.2.4 Voice phishing 
This is a new technique, improved nowadays by phishers. It is believed to 
be one of the newest breakthroughs in telecommunications (FBI 2007); it uses 
VOIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol.  
This technique is called vishing as it uses both voice and phishing to 
conduct the attack. This kind of attack can be conducted in a variety of ways with 
only a few minor differences as illustrated in the following two types of vishing 
attacks: 
a)         In this first scenario, the victim receives a typical e-mail, like any other 
traditional phishing scam. They are then asked to provide information over the 
phone instead of being directed to an internet site. The victim calls the fraud 
“customer service” number (a VOIP account, not a real financial institution) 
providing account numbers, passwords, and other critical information through a 
series of voice-prompted menus (FBI 2007). 
b)         In another scenario, the victim is contacted over the phone instead of by e-
mail. When the receiver answers the fraudulent call, an automated recorded 
message plays, warning the victim about account breaches. The recorded message 
directs the victim to take action in order to protect the account. The trick behind 
this scenario is that the victim receives the call from a spoofed ID number of the 
financial company (FBI 2007). 
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5.2.5 Mobile phishing 
New technology is on the rise; 2006 was evidence of this when phishing 
attacks shifted from PCs to mobile devices. This attack manipulates mobile 
phone operators/carriers’ SMS by sending text messages to mobile users trying 
to trick them into following a malicious mobile internet link (Shah April 2007). 
These types of phishing traps are commonly known as Smishing. 
 
Figure 35 : Scam email using forward attack technique 
Several techniques have been proposed to solve this problem. 
Unfortunately, this type of problem depends on human awareness. Therefore, 
the phishing detection algorithm should not be based completely upon user 
interaction (Ian Fette June 2006). Since phishing exploits human vulnerabilities 
rather than software vulnerabilities, education and awareness are the first steps 
to mitigating the risk of phishing attacks (Larcom and Elbirt 2006; Yue Zhang 
2007). 
5.3 Anti-phishing Solutions  
Three types of solutions can be used to reduce the risk of phishing attacks:  
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5.3.1 Anti-phishing toolbars 
Ebay, NetCraft, GeoTrust, EarthLink, CallingID and other vendors offer 
several toolbars to reduce the risks of phishing attacks. These organisations use 
different methods to determine the legitimacy of websites such as checking the 
IP address, combination of heuristics, user ratings, and manual verification 
(2007; Yue Zhang 2007). 
5.3.2 Browser plug-ins 
Microsoft has added a new plug-in to IE7 to help users detect phishing 
websites. It relies on a blacklist hosted by Microsoft.  Another tool from 
SpoofStick is a simple browser extension that helps users to detect fake websites. 
SpoofStick makes it easier to spot a spoofed website by prominently displaying 
only the most relevant domain information (2005). The Netscape Navigator 8.1 
web browser includes a built-in phishing filter. Firefox 2.0 includes a new 
feature designed to identify fraudulent websites (Yue Zhang 2007). 
5.3.3 Email-filters 
Email filters are the most effective solution to detect spoofed websites, 
since most victims are directed to spoofed websites from phishing emails (Liu, 
Guanglin et al. 2005). By detecting spoofed emails, the user is more secure and 
the solution, in this case is categorised as a preventive solution, while the 
toolbars and browser plug-ins are detective techniques. (Ian Fette June 2006) 
proposed a simple technique to detect spoofed email called PILFER. The filter 
works by incorporating features specifically designed to highlight the deceptive 
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methods used to fool users. 
5.4 Phishing emails features 
By reading and investigating a large number of phishing emails, it was 
noticed that there are many features and tricks that can distinguish legitimate 
emails from phishing ones; part of these features are hidden from the user and 
hard to detect, while others are clearly visible.  
The data set used in this study consists of 1008 phishing emails (Nazario 
Oct 2008) found with source code dedicated for academic research, 600 emails 
to analysis and extract phishing rules while around 408 used for testing the 
developed tool. 
Based on our literature review, the outcome of the survey study at section 
3.5, “Simulation of phishing attack” and the analysis of over 600 phishing emails 
(selected from a different pool of emails), it is found that 6 features are exist in 
more than 96% of this set. All six features are used to develop our technique. 
The features have been categorised into two main categories; the hidden 
features that are invisible to the end-user and normally embedded into the source 
code and the visible features to the recipient normally embedded into the email’s 
body. 
5.4.1 Source code features (back-end)  
These tricks and features are hidden to users and can’t be detected easily, 
apart from by experts or software tools. The following are some of these 
features: 
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5.4.2 IP-based URLs and bon-matching URLs 
Phishers attempt to obscure the destination Web site by hiding the URL. 
This trick is conducted by using the IP address instead of the hostname. An 
example of an IP address used in a fraudulent website is as follows: 
http://210.16.234.67 
In phishing email messages, the link text seen in the email is usually 
different from the actual link destination. As shown in Figure 36, the email 
appears to be aiming to be linking the user to: 
 “https://vault.woodgrove.com/defualt.asp” 
But, as a matter of fact, it links it to  
http://203.144.234.138/us/index.html. 
 
Figure 36 : Non-Matching URLs 
5.4.3 The use of scripts 
Using scripts could help the phishers to hide the destination URL, the 
JavaScript event “onMouseOver” is used widely by fraudsters  to show the 
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victim a false URL in the status bar when the mouse moves over the apparent 
link (Christine E. Drake 2004). 
5.4.4 The use of multiple domains 
Since the phishers share images and links with the legitimate website, 
and forward the victim to the phishing website, it is noticed that phishing emails 
contain multiple domains. 
5.4.5 Content features (front-end)  
These tricks and features are not hidden to the user, and can be easily 
detected if the user acquires sufficient training. Following are then main features 
that can be noticed in phishing emails: 
5.4.6 Generic salutation 
Personalisation of salutation increases the trustworthiness of people who 
are official subscribers and they should receive a personal salutation rather than 
a generic one. Examples of generic salutations are as follows: Dear valued 
customer, Dear client, etc. Some hackers use the email at the welcome salutation 
or extract part of the name from the email. 
5.4.7 Security promises, requires a fast response or “Click Here” link 
To gain the trust of the victim, phishers regularly emphasize security 
issues. They convince users to visit their website, claiming that it is secure 
and safe.   
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Phishing emails may claim that the client’s account information is out 
of date, their credit card has expired, or the account must be verified as a 
regular security procedure. The phishers try to collect information as soon as 
possible before the phishing website is shut down, so they ask the victim for a 
fast response. 
In addition to that, phishers try to trick the victims by using a clear 
hypertext link such as “Click here to login”. The phisher wants the user to 
click this link since it is the most important link in the email. Other links are 
maintained in the email to keep the genuine “feel”, such as the link to the 
privacy policy, and the link to the user agreement, images and logos. 
5.4.8 Links to https:// domains 
In order to deceive the victims, phishers used to post links to https:// 
domains in the front end of the email page, while in the back end it forwards 
the victim to a non-secure link. This feature is found only in phishing emails.   
5.5 Intelligent model for detection and protection 
5.5.1 Using fuzzy logic approach 
Since phishing is a type of social engineering attack, it is the exploitation 
of the vulnerability in human nature rather than of technological weakness. The 
solution is a combination of utilising tools and a rigorous human learning 
approach to avoid different types of attacks such as email phishing, vishing 
(voice phishing) and smishing (SMS phishing). 
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Most of the existing solutions are technical in nature, and are mainly 
tools installed on the user’s computer to monitor and filter phishing emails. We 
suggest that investment in the human element itself as a preventive strategy 
combined with proper utilisation of tools yields better results. 
The first step that should be taken into consideration is the 
implementation of a proficient security awareness program that can help users to 
avoid all the phishing techniques. Such programs will not completely stop the 
effectiveness of the phishing attack, but will reduce it. Awareness programs are 
usually categorised as proactive solutions; therefore they are more effective and 
cost less than reactive solutions. 
In addition to awareness development, one can also consider an 
intelligent system to detect the level of vulnerability, in turn helping to make 
decisions in regard to a phishing attack. This section focuses on a similar scheme 
of methodology to build an effective and preventive anti-phishing tool: 
1. A set of 408 phishing (Nazario Oct 2008) and another 600 non-phishing 
emails were collected to implement the proposed methodology. 
2. All six features discussed in the previous section were used to distinguish 
between legitimate and phishing emails according to their relevance.  
3. Any incoming emails are separated into two parts, front and back end; the 
front end is the visible part of the email that users normally read, while the 
back end is the source code of the email. 
Following diagram shows this process: 
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Figure 37 : Separating front end and back end of incoming email 
4. A VB script was written to extract those features. Initially, the pilot program 
parses emails on two levels; the content level (front end), which is the body of 
the email, and the back end, which is the source code. It extracts all the 
features discussed above and then gives the email scores for each feature (rate 
level) as shown in figure 38. The resulting scores are used to assist in further 
automated phases of assessing whether the email is a phishing not. The 
implementation developed using VBA for script programming and MS 
Access 2007 for the backend database.  
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Figure 38 : Using script to extract features of each layer then rate each layer 
Following are the linguistic descriptors used to represent the phishing 
features indicators: 
Feature Case Risk Rate 
B
ac
k
 E
n
d
 F
ea
tu
re
s 
IP-based URLs  /  
bon-matching 
URLs 
Contains IP address at URL 
(regardless of non-matching URLS) 
or Completely non-matching URLs 
High 
 Moderate 
No IP address and all links exist at 
front end. 
Low 
Contain scripts, 
Forms or 
Functions 
“Onmouseover” script High 
Forms or any kind of other scripts or 
functions 
Moderate 
No any kind of scripts, Forms or 
Functions 
Low 
Number of 
domains 
More than two domains High 
Two domains Moderate 
One domain Low 
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F
ro
n
t 
E
n
d
 F
ea
tu
re
s 
Generic salutation generic salutation (dear customer, 
dear valued member, etc) 
High 
Contains the first name 
(e.g. Dear John) * 
Moderate 
Contains both the first and last name 
or the customer name 
(e.g. Dear John Mick) 
Low 
Security 
promises,  
requires a fast 
respond Or “Click 
Here” link 
More than 10 words High 
From 3 to 12 Moderate 
Up to 5 words  Low 
Using https:// in 
front end 
https at front and no https at the back 
end 
High 
https at the end only Moderate 
Match https at front and back ends Low 
* Sometimes the first name can be extracted from the prefix part of the user’s email. 
Table 16: Features extracted from phishing email 
5. The first phase of the proposed tool is building a set of fuzzy logic (FL) rules 
to get an accurate assessment of a phishing email’s set. These were then 
utilised to develop a FL-based expert system. In brief, a FL expert system is a 
collection of membership functions and rules that are utilised to reason about 
data (J. Buckley and Tucker). The inference process in FL goes through four 
steps (Cox 2001) to achieve the outcome: 
I. Fuzzification, the membership function values defined on the input variables is 
applied to their actual values to determine the degree of truth for each rule 
premise. 
II. Inference, the truth value for the premise of each rule is computed, and applied 
to the conclusion part of that rule. This results in one fuzzy subset to be 
assigned to each output variable for each rule.  
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III. Composition, all of the fuzzy subsets assigned to each output variable are 
combined together to form a single fuzzy subset for each output variable.   
IV. Defuzzification (optional), mainly used when converting the fuzzy output set to 
a crisp number. 
The rule-based system has three input parameters and one output. It contains 
all “IF-THEN” rules for the proposed tool. The result of building FL rules for six 
features is that each feature has three linguistic variables (Low, Moderate and 
High) and it will need a complicated process of 3
6
 rules, i.e. 729 rules. This may 
affect the speed of the proposed tool. Due to the large number of aforementioned 
rules, the evaluation process is divided into two layers with two groups in the first 
layer (Back End and Front End groups). The first layer is to rate each group 
separately. This layer is called the rule-based layer. Each group has three 
linguistic variables with a total number of 27 rules. Therefore, 54 rules are built to 
evaluate the Back End and Front End groups separately. 
For each group, three output fuzzy sets are defined: (Trusted, Doubtful and 
Un-Trusted) 
The fuzzy rules were built based on analysing 600 phishing emails by extracting the six 
features from each email. Some interesting facts have been found such as:  
1) Any incoming email contains a public salutation such as “Dear …..” is most likely 
a phishing email since service providers contact their customers by official names. 
2) Any email urge people to click on a link is most likely a phishing email. 
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3) If the email explicitly contains a link such as “https://”, it is most likely to be a 
trick to give the impression of secure link. 
The following table is the 27 fuzzy rules for Back End group risk probability: 
Rule # Domains 
conflict (IP, Non-
matching URLs , 
Contains 
(Scripts 
,Functions and 
forms) 
 
Multi domain 
(not registered) 
Safety Rate 
(Trusted) 
(Doubtful) 
(Un Trusted) 
1 High High High Un Trusted 
2 High High Mod Un Trusted 
3 High High Low (Doubtful) 
4 High Mod High Un Trusted 
5 High Mod Mod Un Trusted 
6 High Mod Low (Doubtful) 
7 High Low High Un Trusted 
8 High Low Mod (Doubtful) 
9  High Low Low (Doubtful) 
10  Mod High High Un Trusted 
11 Mod High Mod Un Trusted 
12 Mod High Low Un Trusted 
13 Mod Mod High (Doubtful) 
14 Mod Mod Mod (Doubtful) 
15 Mod Mod Low Trusted 
16 Mod Low High (Doubtful) 
17 Mod Low Mod (Doubtful) 
18 Mod Low Low Trusted 
19 Low High High (Doubtful) 
20 Low High Mod (Doubtful) 
21 Low High Low Trusted 
22 Low Mod High (Doubtful) 
23 Low Mod Mod Trusted 
24 Low Mod Low (Doubtful) 
25 Low Low High (Doubtful) 
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26 Low Low Mod Trusted 
27 Low Low Low Trusted 
Table 17: Back end features rules 
 Following table contains the fuzzy rules for Front End group risk probability:  
Rule # Salutation 
(contains 
Name) 
Warning, action to take, 
menace and 
Click here , Security 
promises 
Https Safety Rate 
(Trusted) 
(Doubtful) 
(Un Trusted) 
1 High High High Un Trusted 
2 High High Mod Un Trusted 
3 High High Low Un Trusted 
4 High Mod High Un Trusted 
5 High Mod Mod (Doubtful) 
6 High Mod Low (Doubtful) 
7 High Low High Un Trusted 
8 High Low Mod (Doubtful) 
9  High Low Low Trusted 
10  Mod High High Un Trusted 
11 Mod High Mod (Doubtful) 
12 Mod High Low (Doubtful) 
13 Mod Mod High Un Trusted 
14 Mod Mod Mod (Doubtful) 
15 Mod Mod Low Trusted 
16 Mod Low High Un Trusted 
17 Mod Low Mod (Doubtful) 
18 Mod Low Low Trusted 
19 Low High High (Doubtful) 
20 Low High Mod  Trusted 
21 Low High Low Trusted 
22 Low Mod High Trusted 
23 Low Mod Mod (Doubtful) 
24 Low Mod Low Trusted 
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25 Low Low High (Doubtful) 
26 Low Low Mod Trusted 
27 Low Low Low Trusted 
Table 18: Front end features rules 
The output of both groups is the input of the second layer which is the 
rule-based two. Finally, a set of nine rules are built in that layer to evaluate the 
email for the final rating 
The following table is the second layer of the rule-based; two inputs are 
used for final email rating. 
Rule 
# 
Back End  
Group  
Front End 
Group 
Final Evaluation 
1 Trusted Trusted Safe 
2 Trusted Doubtful Safe 
3 Trusted Un Trusted Partially Safe 
4 Doubtful Trusted Partially Safe 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Partially Safe 
6 Doubtful Un Trusted Phishy 
7 Un Trusted Trusted Partially Safe 
8 Un Trusted Doubtful Phishy 
9 Un Trusted Un Trusted Phishy 
Table 19: Rule Based 2 for Final Email Evaluation 
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The three-dimensional plot for rule base 2 is displayed as below: 
 
Figure 39: Three-dimensional plots for rule base 2 
5.5.2 Experiment and results 
In order to gain a clear idea about how phishing works and what effect it 
has on its victims, each email has been divided into two parts; Front end, which 
is the email body (content part that the user can normally read) and back end 
(which is the source code of the email and hidden from the user). First of all, the 
features mentioned in part IV are extracted from both front and back ends, and 
then each feature is assigned a value of risk (High, Moderate or Low) by rating 
the front end. It is much easier to explain to users the reasons why the emails are 
risky; thus it helps to prevent users becoming victims when they use unprotected 
environments. Secondly, the output of each group is passed into the rule-based 2 
layer (table 1) to find the final rating of the email. Each email is rated as Safe, 
Partially Safe or Phishy.  
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By examining an initial number of healthy and phishing emails, the 
proposed tool rated 22% of the emails as suspicious phishing emails (Partially 
Safe) and 78% as Phishy, while 95% of the healthy emails passed as Safe emails 
with 5% rated Partially Safe as shown in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40: Results of evaluating phishing and healthy emails 
In order to improve the accuracy of the proposed tool, the results of our 
experiments were compared with Microsoft Windows Live Mail 2009, which is 
an existing mail tool containing an anti-phishing detector. Testing the same 
dataset of phishing emails, Microsoft Windows Live Mail 2009 flagged 58% as 
suspicious phishing emails while 42% were not detected. Figure 41 shows the 
comparison between the proposed tool and Microsoft Windows live mail 2009. 
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Figure 41: Results of comparison the proposed tool with Microsoft Windows live mail 2009 
The following diagram 41 shows a comparison results between Thunderbird 
email client and Avira Anti–virus based on testing another new set of 408 phishing 
emails. Those emails are different from the 1200 emails used to extract the rules of 
the proposed anti-phishing tool. 
 
Figure 42: Results of comparison the proposed tool with Thunder bird and Avira Anti-virus 
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Finally, 94% of the phishing emails were found to deceptive users at the 
front end layer of the incoming email (the visible part of the email); so by 
implementing a sufficient awareness security program, people will be able to 
detect phishing emails easily, as figure 43 shows the results of evaluating the 
front end vs. the back end. 
 
Figure 43 : Front End vs. Back End 
According to the analysis of the phishing emails, the end-user will be made 
aware of three main features: 
1. Since the phishers do not have the database of the victims, the user should 
notice his/her registered name at the salutation line of the incoming email. 
2. Asking the user for a fast response and offering many security promises could 
be a trick to convince the victim that they are aiming to visit a secure website 
for a critical issue. 
3. Including “http://” link on the front end of the email could be a trick to deceive 
the user. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Front End Back End
Trusted
Doubtful
UN Trusted
CHAPTER FIVE 
129 
Diagram 44 shows the interface of the phishing email captured tool, noting 
that emails can be categorised as Inbox (safe), suspicious, and phishing. 
 
Figure 44 : Phishing emails capture module 
In this module, the spoofed link is removed automatically inside the 
incoming email; this is a kind of enforcing policy to protect nonchalant users 
who usually try unfamiliar links. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents an examination of the social engineering issues and 
technical aspects of detection of and protection against phishing, vishing and smishing. 
A detailed literature survey is used to provide an analysis of different contexts of 
vulnerability of the user and to demonstrate the existing state of technology. Particular 
attention has been paid to email phishing as it is considered one of the most common 
attacks on individual vulnerability. It is clearly demonstrated that, by determining the 
main differences between the legitimate emails and the phishing, one can reduce the risk 
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of this type of attack. In addition, a fuzzy logic-based intelligent expert system has been 
explored to evaluate its suitability for real-time detection and protection. A new 
approach of dividing phishing e-mails into layers and groups is used. This has helped to 
simplify the implementation of fuzzy rules in a speedy and efficient way by rating each 
group individually. 
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
Information security is an important aspect for preserving confidentiality, 
availability and integrity against various threats. Several studies and reviews suggest 
that hazards against information have been growing rapidly and occur on daily basis. 
Furthermore, as human element is considered as the weakest link in security process, 
social engineering attacks are targeting people who are exposed in the systems. In this 
study, we have declared, analysed and proposed solutions for two major types of social 
engineering attacks, shoulder surfing and phishing emails.  
Expert systems are used widely in different fields nowadays. Recently, computer 
solutions including intrusion detection systems, anti-virus, learning systems, decision 
making algorithms etc, depends on various expert systems such as knowledge based 
systems, fuzzy logic, data mining, neural networks and a wide range of artificial 
intelligence techniques.  
Based on fuzzy logic expert system, a security framework has been developed in 
order to integrate people, procedures and physical information security controls to 
reduce the impact of social engineering attacks. The proposed tools enforce the security 
policies and popup concise educational messages to help users understand the reasons 
for the decisions taken by the intelligent tools. 
The case studies in Chapter three implies that underestimation the importance of 
security policies or implementing insufficient procedures and rules could increase the 
vulnerabilities of the system by exposing it to severe threats, such as malware, virus and 
phishing attacks. Appling sufficient security policies and enforce it in some cases along 
with awareness and education programs, threats will defiantly mitigated. It is 
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considerable importance to integrate the mentioned security policies into a consistent 
security system followed with a security audit process to address and insure the 
continuity of the running systems. 
In chapter four, the proposed model has been implemented through an intelligent 
tool (PTool) to measure the strength of passwords using Fuzzy rule sets that may help to 
prevent dictionary, brute-force and shoulder surfing attacks simultaneously. Length of 
password and dictionary based are the main factors used by existing tools to measure 
password strength. In this research, Entropy has been added as a new factor to measure 
a given password by taking into consideration the sequences of keyboard patterns and 
repeated characters. Finally, the performance of the proposed tool has been compared 
with major providers around the world, such as Microsoft, Yahoo and Google, in order 
to demonstrate its merits and capabilities Awareness is presented in this module through 
guidance and massages that explain the reasons behind password rate. Furthermore, 
refusing weak passwords is considered as enforcing policy to avoid system 
vulnerability. 
In chapter five, we examine the social engineering issues and technical aspects 
related to detection and protection against phishing, vishing and smishing, which are 
considered to be one of the most common attacks on individual vulnerability. It is 
clearly demonstrated that by determining the main differences between the legitimate 
emails and the phishing, one can reduce the risk of this type of attack. In addition, a 
fuzzy logic-based intelligent expert system has been explored to evaluate the suitability 
of real-time detection and protection. A new approach of dividing phishing e-mails into 
layers and groups is used. This has helped to simplify implementing fuzzy rules in a 
speedy and efficient way by rating each group individually, incoming emails are 
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categorised into safe, suspicious and phishy emails. Users are aware of such attacks by 
popup guidance messages that show the suspicious parts of the phishing emails. 
Future work 
Firstly, the proposed model should be assessed as an integrated framework to 
people, procedures and security controls. The assessment should especially focus on the 
awareness and education part, which is related to people. The reliability of the proposed 
model will be measured through assessment schemes, which will be conducted before 
and after the model is implemented.  
Secondly, the qualitative approach used to examine phishing email attacks is 
improved by using a quantitative approach. Accordingly, the degree of phishing email 
will be presented by numeric value based on the level of attack. 
Thirdly, the awareness and education part should be taken into consideration as 
an important entity of the security process. The feedback of the survey in section 3.5 
shows that people appreciate this kind of awareness. Thus, future modules should 
contain additional dose of education in different forms. 
Finally, the model should be tested in different social engineering attacks, such 
as phones phishing, tailgating and other frauds emails.  
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6.2 Feedback of the survey conducted at section 3.5  
Timestamp Gender Job 
Educatio
n Level 
Country 
of 
resident 
did you hear 
about phishing 
problem before? 
how much 
spoofed website 
that I show you 
looks like 
legtimate one? 
one objective of 
this study is to 
aware you 
about this 
problem, do you 
think it was 
useful study? 
how do you 
think we can 
reduce the 
risk of this 
problem 
(phishing)? 
if you 
know this 
problem 
before, tell 
me your 
experience 
with it 
please s in 
few 
words.. 
7/7/2012 
0:27:34 Female 
Not 
Working 
University 
Graduate Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/9/2012 
10:11:03 Male Employee 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia I'm not sure about it slightly different yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and 
security 
software 
They 
hijacked my 
friend 
yahoo 
email and 
he lost his 
data 
7/7/2012 
0:27:52 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 جماربو بيردتلا
 ةيامحلا
ادح ةيرورض 
7/7/2012 
11:50:24 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
  ، ةهباشم لكاشم نع تعمس. اهنع ةحضاو ةركف يدل نكت مل نكلو 
. ةلكشملا هذهل هيلع تعلطا حرش طسبأو حضوأ اذه 
. لبقتسملا يف ًاصيرح نوكأ نأ لواحأس 
. ًاريخ الله كازج 
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7/7/2012 
12:34:01 Male Student 
High 
Study Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/7/2012 
13:02:43 Female Student School Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/7/2012 
13:02:57 Female Student School Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/7/2012 
13:16:36 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
  I learnt about this problem from messages which i received from my bank highlighting this problem. 
There was a software that was distributed by my bank website to help avoid phishing website. I think it was called trusteer.  
7/7/2012 
13:43:56 Male Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/7/2012 
16:23:41 Male Employee 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/8/2012 
5:59:06 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/11/2012 
15:16:40 Male Student 
High 
Study Other 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them 
 there are some software that can identify these phishing pages. one of the very simple techiques is that it checks the link from the HTML page itself. the link 
looks like that <a href="real destination page">visible displayed part</a>. it applies matching tecniques on the "real destination page" and the "visible displayed 
part". it alerts the user if the following conditions are met: 
1- if the "real destination page" and the "visible displayed part" are not matching at all. for instance "visible displayed part" is : facebook and "real destination 
page" is: www.omra. bla bla 
2- if the "real destination page" is not secured website (sometimes denoted by https). 
3- if some java scripts are to be executed by the "real destination page". 
Thanks. and one more thing do not forget to add Egypt in the countries combobox or Morsi will be upset :) Walid Adly:) just kidding. 
7/8/2012 
6:44:09 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/8/2012 
7:03:33 Male Employee 
High 
Study Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
  تاحفص هبشت تاحفص كانه نأ ملعأHotmail ورتكللإا هديرب ةقرس مت هنا ةرتف دعب مدختسملا فشتكي مث ،يراجت نلاعإ لكش ىلعو ادج يداع ينورتكلإ ديرب للاخ نم مدختسملل رهظت تناك ىلإ هنم لئاسر لاسرإو ين
.هباش ام وأ ةدعاسم بلطل ءاقدصلأا 
7/12/2012 Male Employee High UK yes I know it very slightly different yes, very useful By Training and 
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0:49:43 Study well awarness 
programs 
Yes, I have been hacked by receiveing a link through yahoo, sent automatically from my friend through his messenger to all people in his list in which I was one 
of them. 
 Although, I am a techincal person, however this was the firt time have been fooled by such a trick. I actually was tempted by the title of the link which made me 
click on the link then I got a page which is exactly the same as Yahoo login detail, I was kind enough to enter my Yahoo email address, after second my Yahoo 
been taken by somebody else and he started to talk to my family through the messenger. 
Although I was lucky enough by having a recovery email which manged to bring back. However, to me,  this is one of the most dangrous type of spoofing. 
 
Thanks 
 
Mohammed 
7/8/2012 
12:07:48 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/12/2012 
18:44:34 Female Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
12:21:30 Male Student School UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 ( نيعقوملا لاك نم وا هفرعا لا عقوم يا نم ةلاسر تيقلت اذاfacebook, hotmail ) 
..اهناونع ءارق دعب  ةلاسرلا فذحب موقا 
7/8/2012 
13:16:39 Male Student School Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and 
security 
software   
7/8/2012 
14:12:30 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate 
Saudi 
Arabia 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them 
 
Part of my work is to sell security solutions and this is only an example of the things we present to our prospects. 
7/14/2012 
13:27:47 Male Student School Jordan I'm not sure about it slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
14:15:06 Male Student 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
14:18:14 Female Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and   
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security 
software 
7/8/2012 
14:19:55 Female Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
15:26:27 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Canada 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs   
7/8/2012 
15:42:57 Female Student 
University 
Graduate USA 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/23/2012 
15:18:31 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them 
I never 
responded 
to such 
emails. As i 
know the 
risk of 
responding 
7/8/2012 
16:03:49 Male Student 
High 
Study Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and 
security 
software   
7/26/2012 
13:21:37 Male Student 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it They are not similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
16:04:41 Male 
Not 
Working 
High 
Study Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
  اهيلع ةرطيسلا متيل ىرخأ ةرم رسلا ةملكو مدختسملا مسا ةباتك لجأ نم لصاوتلا عقاوم تاحفصل ةهباشم طباور لاسرلإ نوؤجلي زركاهلا ضعب.كباسح قارتخاو زركهلا لبق نم 
7/26/2012 
18:40:56 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
First time I hear 
about it They are not similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
16:55:11 Male Student 
High 
Study UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs 
  نأ انم نوبلطي ثيح كوبسيفلا ىلع مهفرعن لا سانأ نم يتأت ةداع نوكت لكاشملا هذه!مهل توصن 
!يمسر عقوم تسيل و ديصن ةيلمع يه ةحفصلا هذه نأ كل رهظت ةديدجلا تاحفصتملا 
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7/8/2012 
17:24:25 Male Student School Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
  ليميلاا قيرط نع هتعجرتسا نكلاو كوب سيفلا ىلع يباسح قرسو ةرم ةلكشملا هذهل تضرعت 
 هتاباسح لك يف هباشتم ريغ دروساب صخشلا لعجي نا لضفا 
7/8/2012 
17:31:24 Male Employee 
High 
Study Canada 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar No, it wasn't Both of them   
7/8/2012 
18:52:11 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate 
Saudi 
Arabia I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 هفلتخم تلااصتا طئاسوب اهنع تامولعم لاسرإ مت   ، عيمجلا الله قفو ، انمدق ام كديفي نا ىسع ، كل اًركش ،هذه ةقدلاب نوكت نا عقوتا نكا مل نكلو ، فحصلا يف اهنع تأرقو 
7/8/2012 
19:38:50 Male Employee 
High 
Study Other 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them 
 Yes I knew it. When I have suspicions about any website link recieved by email, I rarely clicked on it. Also, I clicked on the link, then normally I check to see if 
the webpage like is changed or not. 
7/8/2012 
19:41:00 Male Student School Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
19:54:43 Male 
Buisnessm
an 
High 
Study Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 I have read some about this problem specially with facebook; when i thought my account was hacked, and i heard about not just phishing but also , someone 
might add you on facebook as a friend and after you accept him/her they will share a link on your wall that if you click it or share it they hack you, i think its 
similar to phishing but i am only a user not an expert, this was helpfull thank you, Jazakom Allah Khairan 
  
7/8/2012 
22:10:20 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 if you put the mouse on the fake link, you can see the actual website on the bottom of the browser when you place the mouse above the link,, 
 this is how i find out that the email/link is fake. 
for example (in your examples before) when i placed the mouse on the \"www.hotmail.com" link (without clicking) i found out that the website is actually 
ww.omran.....etc 
 i also usually check the email address when the email is suspicious; the name is similar to my friend's name but the email ID is not 
I wish you all the best,, 
7/8/2012 
22:38:14 Female 
Not 
Working 
University 
Graduate UAE I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 Really i heard about this problem before but the thing i didnt know is that they have made the same pages of the social networks which makes people trust 
them. 
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According to me I usually dont open any suspicious email except some cases like sending email for a specific destination   
7/8/2012 
22:39:29 Male Student School UAE I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/9/2012 
0:16:51 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/9/2012 
8:25:17 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Kuwait 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/9/2012 
10:50:35 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/9/2012 
16:12:05 Male Employee School UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 Thank You for this. 
Although I was aware of phishing before, I do feel that this type of study is useful to raise awareness of the problem, and the threats attached to it. 
Thanks, Farzan 
7/9/2012 
20:37:43 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
I always 
look at the 
site 
address. 
7/10/2012 
0:11:30 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/10/2012 
10:28:37 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and 
security 
software 
 Friend of mine was affected where he lost his e-mail because of that. 
After contacting the e-mail company we have managed to get it back. 
7/7/2012 
13:00:56 Male Student 
University 
Graduate UK I'm not sure about it slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/10/2012 
11:28:45 Male Student Diploma UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/10/2012 
20:45:03 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
usually 
when I 
receive 
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such 
emails, I 
trash them. 
7/10/2012 
21:43:27 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs   
7/11/2012 
7:04:55 Male Employee 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs   
7/11/2012 
13:07:54 Male Student School UK I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/7/2012 
23:36:20 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/11/2012 
15:46:36 Female Employee 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/11/2012 
15:58:15 Female Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar No, it wasn't Both of them   
7/12/2012 
17:22:08 Male Student 
High 
Study Other I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
8:31:17 Male Student School Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes,, it was ok Both of them 
 اتحي لا عوضوملا حبصا هنا ثيحب ةلكشملا نمكت انهو تاحفصلا هذه لثم ءاشنا لاع دعاست اصحت لاو دعت لا يتلا تايدتنملا نم ريثكلا كانه عيطتستل فرتحم ركاه نوكت نلأ ج.لاجملا اذه نم لايتحلاا 
7/8/2012 
9:52:15 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs 
  تاحفص قارتخا  دسلأا ماظنل عباتلا ينورتكللإا شيجلا بابش ضعب لواح اندنع ةلكشملا هذه تثدح ىلع باسح مهيدل نيذلا ىلع حجنت مل و ليمتوهلا ىلع باسح مهيدل نيذلا صاخشلأا ىلع ةحجان مهتلواحم تناكو . نيطشانلا
. ليم يج  ليمتوهلا نم ةيامح ىوقأ ليم يجلا ةكرش نأ ىلإ ببسلا دوعي امبر ،. مكلرسيو مكيلع حتفي الله ،اركشو 
7/12/2012 
21:25:07 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/12/2012 
23:10:59 Female 
Not 
Working 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/13/2012 
16:45:31 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them 
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I have read about this problem when I started receiving some email which was asking for passwords. 
7/16/2012 
2:02:36 Male Employee 
High 
Study 
Saudi 
Arabia I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/16/2012 
7:44:10 Male Employee 
High 
Study UAE 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/16/2012 
12:38:46 Male Employee School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs 
 ...اريثك كركشأ
 كنم تدفتسا دقل
يزيزع اي اريثك 
7/16/2012 
18:52:40 Male Student 
High 
Study Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
7/8/2012 
15:20:58 Male Student School UAE 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/16/2012 
19:33:26 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/18/2012 
19:26:50 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/22/2012 
14:48:57 Male Employee 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 so great study, its give good awareness message to users, i like it 
7/25/2012 
20:58:22 Male Employee 
High 
Study Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 the facebook page shocked me,,its look like it,, i was think its really facebook page 
excellent study 
7/26/2012 
6:35:57 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 ةعئار ةبرجت
 بجي هنأ دقتعا
 رشنل اهميمعت
ةدافتسلاا 
7/26/2012 
6:40:50 Male 
Buisnessm
an 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/26/2012 
18:40:32 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/26/2012 Male Student High UK First time I hear they are very yes, very useful Both of them   
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18:47:27 Study about it similar 
7/27/2012 
17:51:10 Male Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/29/2012 
3:30:57 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/8/2012 
19:42:04 Male Student Diploma USA 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them 
 I had friends who received spoofed paypal emails from people who wanted to buy their items. so the person receives fake email from "paypal" telling them that 
money has been put into their account and the person who is uneducated about this topic does not log in to the real paypal to check, he sent out the item and 
got scammed.  
7/29/2012 
6:41:39 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/29/2012 
19:18:51 Male Student 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/29/2012 
19:19:46 Male Employee 
High 
Study Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/29/2012 
20:02:13 Male Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/29/2012 
22:39:07 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/9/2012 
6:39:38 Male Student School UAE 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/30/2012 
1:38:32 Female Employee 
High 
Study UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/10/2012 
20:50:46 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan I'm not sure about it slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/10/2012 
21:00:42 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate UAE 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes,, it was ok 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs   
7/14/2012 
16:07:57 Female Student 
High 
Study Jordan I'm not sure about it slightly different yes, very useful Both of them   
7/15/2012 
8:47:09 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
yes I know it very 
well slightly different yes,, it was ok Both of them   
APPENDIX - B 
 
1
5
2
 
7/30/2012 
1:40:50 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate UK 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/30/2012 
6:02:11 Male Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
7/30/2012 
18:19:48 Male 
Buisnessm
an 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/1/2012 
3:16:45 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/1/2012 
3:17:01 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/1/2012 
3:17:18 Male Employee 
High 
Study Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/1/2012 
3:19:13 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/1/2012 
3:20:13 Male Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
By Training and 
awarness 
programs   
8/1/2012 
3:22:36 Female Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
5:45:28 Male 
Buisnessm
an 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
5:53:56 Male Student 
High 
Study UK 
yes I know it very 
well 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them 
 Phishing is an illegal activity that the hacker tricks people into divulging sensitive information, such as bank and credit card accounts, its forbidden to such 
attack,, and its so important to aware propel about this kind of security problems, thanks for this experiment. Wael  
8/2/2012 
20:05:01 Male Student 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
20:06:06 Female Employee 
High 
Study Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
20:20:04 Female Student School Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
22:08:16 Female 
Buisnessm
an Diploma Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
APPENDIX - B 
 
1
5
3
 
8/2/2012 
22:09:44 Male Employee 
High 
Study Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
22:10:55 Female Student 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
22:11:42 Male Employee 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/2/2012 
23:05:39 Male Employee Diploma Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful 
Anti-phishing 
tools and 
security 
software   
8/2/2012 
23:09:05 Female Employee Diploma Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
8/3/2012 
3:16:53 Female Student 
University 
Graduate Jordan 
First time I hear 
about it 
they are very 
similar yes,, it was ok Both of them   
8/3/2012 
5:46:46 Male Employee Diploma Jordan I'm not sure about it 
they are very 
similar yes, very useful Both of them   
 
